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The debate regarding the nature and the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties 
owed by company directors finds its origins in 19th century jurisprudence. The 
debate is both complex and dynamic, with varying considerations being taken 
into account depending on the jurisdiction and the prevalent economic and 
commercial context. In addition, the position in each jurisdiction derives its 
color from historical and cultural factors that are indigenous to its corporate 
governance framework.
There has been a preponderance of corporate failures across jurisdictions 
over the last century, and substantial legal research is now dedicated to address-
ing the nuances of the occurrence and impact of insolvency. It was thus inevi-
table that the debate would extend to whose interests should be taken into ac-
count in the event of corporate insolvency. This debate primarily concerns the 
company’s shareholders and its creditors. Although several other constituencies 
are affected by a company’s functioning (as well as its financial deterioration), 
and should ideally be taken into account in such a debate, the focus across juris-
dictions has been on the shareholders and creditors. This is due to the fact that 
creditors essentially encompass and represent the interests of several other 
stakeholders, constituting the “other side of the spectrum” to the shareholder-
primacy focused approach.1 When one is able to successfully move away from 
shareholder primacy, this opens up the possibility of looking at the interests of 
several others that were previously ignored.
The debate centers on the identification of the rightful beneficiaries of fidu-
ciaries duties during the various stages of a corporation’s financial health, 
namely: (i) solvency/financial stability; (ii) actual insolvency; and (iii) the 
zone/vicinity of insolvency (the “zone”).2 In each stage of the company’s fi-
nancial existence, there are those that advocate for maximization of shareholder 
wealth, and others who believe in a more inclusive approach, with other stake-
holders and the company’s creditors also being considered in decision making.3
In some cases (such as in insolvency), however, proponents of the inclusive ap-
1. See J. William Callison,  Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of Insolvent Business 
Entities is Incorrect as a Matter of Theory and Practice, 1(2) J. BUS. & TECH. L.431 (2007).
2. Thus, the debate no longer functions as a binary of ‘solvency’ versus ‘insolvency’, and 
takes into account the need for a re-prioritization when the company has entered into a stage of fi-
nancial decline.
3. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 28 (2d ed. 2008); See Charles Handy, What is a Company For?, 1 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14, 14 (1993).
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proach argue for duties being owed to the company’s creditors and its other 
stakeholders, to the exclusion of its shareholders.4
The inherent conflict stems from the contrasting behavioral tendencies of 
the two primary constituencies, which is a direct consequence of the conflicting 
inter-se rights that the law confers upon them. As part of general corporate the-
ory, there is heterogeneity between contractual rights accorded to shareholders 
vis-à-vis those accorded to creditors: shareholders being entitled to participation 
rights in the company in the form of dividends, and creditors only being entitled 
to receive repayment on their debts calculated against the time value of money.5
Although the conflict exists right from the time of inception of a company (or 
from the time when it first has third-party debt on its books), the magnitude of 
the divergence in interests is greatly exacerbated as the financial health of the 
company deteriorates.6  As long as the corporation displays signs of financial 
vitality, neither constituency has the incentive to pursue its interests to the dis-
advantage of the other, and the conflict remains in a latent state.7 However,
when it becomes evident that the corporation is showing signs of financial dete-
rioration, the interests of creditors inevitably become at odds with those of the 
shareholders.8 Arising from a fear of being unable to recover one’s investment 
or debt, both constituencies are incentivized to focus on maximization of their 
returns in the short term, as opposed to the best interests of the company (and its 
other stakeholders).9 The sources of conflict are four-fold: (i) the risk-level to 
be adopted in decision making; (ii) the contest to recover maximum investment; 
(iii) the decision to liquidate the firm versus keeping the firm as a going con-
cern; and (iv) the decision to venture into new projects and to make fresh in-
vestments.10
As shareholder liability is limited to the value of investment in the compa-
ny, shareholders usually favor risk-taking behavior in pursuit of the faintest 
possibility that the company may redeem itself.11 Although shareholders have 
negligible claims in the insolvent liquidation of a company, they stand to gain 
4. See Myron M. Sheinfeld and Judy Harris Pippitt, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a 
Corporation in the Vicinity of Insolvency and After Initiation of a Bankruptcy Case, 60(1) THE
BUSINESS LAWYER 79, 79–107 (2004).
5. See generally Charles P. Normandin, The Changing Nature of Debt 
and Equity: A Legal Perspective, available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7c99/
d90e333475c57f9cd66cbd918f2056ebce6d.pdf.
6. Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Direc-
tors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1993).
7. Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency: A 
Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan, 26(1) PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 139, 139–
68 (2007).
8. See id. at 1489.
9. See id. at 1486.
10. See id. at 1489.
11. See Henry T.C. Hu and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to 
Creditors, 107(6) COL. L. REV. 1321–403 (2007).
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enormously in situations where risky actions result in increased profitability.
The doctrine of limited liability thus results in a moral hazard, wherein share-
holders are incentivized to make decisions that could adversely impact the cor-
poration and its other stakeholders, with the possibility of any upside accruing 
only in their favor.12
On the other hand, creditors tend to be more risk-averse during the corpora-
tion’s financial decline, their goal being to prevent any erosion of net asset val-
ue that would diminish the corporation’s liquidation estate (from which their 
claims are satisfied in insolvent liquidation) or impact the assets over which 
they hold security interests.13 As opposed to the gains that accrue to sharehold-
ers from smart and strategic investments, creditors do not stand to gain much 
from decisions that are ‘high-risk, high-reward,’ but also bear a downside risk.14
Thus there is no incentive for creditors to pursue an efficacious turn-around for 
the company unless they also stand to gain in the process (for example, where 
creditors attain the status of residual claimants by way of an arrangement 
wherein they are to receive equity in a reorganized firm in exchange for their 
claims).15 It is then only the shareholders, that reap the fruits of an upside gain 
in an insolvency scenario.16 As a result, neither shareholders nor creditors have 
the incentive to opt for a “balanced approach” that would solely advance the in-
terests of the deteriorating corporation.
Several thinkers have entered the debate, and opinions have largely been 
polarized. There are those that justify the “shareholder primacy approach.”
Most of this approach’s foundational literature deals with duties of directors of 
a financially stable entity, when the debate had not yet progressed to encompass 
insolvency scenarios.
In this regard, the “natural entity theory” postulated by Millon17 and oth-
ers,18 posits that corporations exist only by way of agglomeration of private ini-
tiatives of its shareholders as its residual claimants.19 As the shareholders bear 
12. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the 
Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335, 355 (2007), http://digitalcommons.law.
umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol1/iss2/7.
13. Andrey Keay, The Director’s Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company Credi-
tors: When Is It Triggered, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 318, 315–39 (2001).
14. See generally Viral V. Acharya, Yakov Amihud & Lubomir Litov, Creditor Rights and 
Corporate Risk-Taking, 102(1) J. OF FIN. ECON. 150–66 (2011).
15. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 542–43 (1983).
16. Cory Dean Kandestin, Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms: Eliminating the Near-
Insolvency Distinction, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Lin, supra note 6.
17. David K. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES 32 (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-
doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html.
19. See Michael Bradley, Cindy Schipani, Anant Sundaram & James P. Walsh, The Purpos-
es and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a 
Crossroads, 62 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
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a greater risk than the corporation’s fixed claimants (its creditors), the corpora-
tion is beholden to the interests of the shareholders.20 Berle also supported a 
shareholder primacy approach (as part of the famous Berle-Dodd debate).21
Berle considered shareholder primacy as the only viable approach that promot-
ed the concept of a free market economy (on account of its focus on profit max-
imization), and opined that other stakeholders were only so deserving if they 
were similarly situated in their contractual relationships with the corporation.22
Berle remarked, “owner-shareholders ought to receive the profits of the corpo-
ration because they acquired ownership of the corporate venture and are the 
rightful benefactors of all corporate economic surplus to the exclusion of non-
owners.”23 Some have also argued that a non-shareholder-focused approach 
would amount to spending “other people’s money.”24 On the other hand, pro-
ponents25 of Dodd’s position26 contest this understanding, and refute Berle’s 
foundational premise that a corporation’s allegiance lies primarily with its 
shareholders.
Dodd posited that, in the eyes of the public, corporations constitute econom-
ic institutions that play a role in social welfare (over and above just profit max-
imization), and that corporations owe their duties to other stakeholders as well 
(including their employees, customers, and creditors).27 In response to Berle’s
position, some argued that a company is incapable of being “owned” and that 
owning shares does not equate to ownership of the company.28 As a corollary, 
it was also argued that a corporation constitutes more than just a web of con-
tracts and more than “a mere aggregation of individual units,” being a juristic 
Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993); Jonathan R.
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a 
Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999).
20. See also REINIER KRAAKMAN ET. AL, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 14–15
(2d ed. 2009).
21. Adolf A Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365 (1932).
22. See Stephen Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 42 (2001).
23. ADOLF A BERLE JR. AND GARDINER C MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968).
24. Douglas Baird & Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 
(2008).
25. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globalization, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 720 (2002).
26. Edwin Merrick Jr. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45(7) HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932).
27. Id.
28. Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 
(1980); Ciaran O’Kelly, History Begins: Shareholder Value, Accountability and the Virtuous State,
60 N. IR. LEGAL. Q. 35, 38 (2009); John Parkinson, Model of the Company and the Employment 
Relationship, 41 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 481, 483 (2003).
296 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 8:291
person in itself.29 While Berle finally conceded to Dodd in the debate, it seems 
that the legal community at large remained rather unmoved by this concession, 
and many countries across the world continue to adopt the shareholder primacy 
approach during a company’s solvency.30
More recent theories in support of shareholder primacy include the belief 
that direct obligations towards other constituencies would result in inefficien-
cies in corporate governance31 as well as redistribution that would unduly bene-
fit creditors in excess of what they are owed under their contractual arrange-
ments.32 Further, it is contended that maximization of shareholder value results 
in a trickle-down effect that maximizes overall stakeholder value.33 Some argue 
that the only reason for directors to consider creditors’ interests is the motive to 
safeguard themselves against the resultant loss in goodwill in the credit market 
in situations where such interests are not taken into account.34
Authors supporting creditor protection argue that creditors should be owed 
duties in light of the inherent asymmetry of information and inequality of bar-
gaining power that exists at the time of contracting, in addition to the unendura-
ble costs of monitoring and ensuring compliance post the execution of con-
tracts.35 Some arguments are based on utilitarianism and principles of fairness, 
and are premised on the possibility of corporate failure resulting in creditors not 
being able to meet their own obligations, resulting in a ripple effect.36 As a 
corollary, the concept of limited liability of shareholders is considered unfair, as 
it results in an undue burden of business risk falling on creditors.37
However, fiduciary duties are always routed to the relevant beneficiaries 
through the corporate enterprise itself (although the US deviated from this ap-
proach for a considerable time before correcting itself).38 Thus, the primary du-
ty of directors is ordinarily to the corporate enterprise itself; the corporation not 
being capable of enforcing fiduciary duties, which are only “enforceable” by the 
29. See THOMAS B. COURTNEY, THE LAW OF COMPANIES 168 (3d ed. 2012); Margaret Blair 
& Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 277 (1999).
30. Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United 
Kingdom’s Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach, 29 SYD. L. REV. 577 (2007).
31. See Harry J. Glasbeek, More Direct Director Responsibility: Much Ado about . . . what?
25 CAN. BUS. L. J. 416, 421 (1995).
32. See Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to 
Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 665, 669 (2003).
33. Keith Davis, The Case for and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities,
16 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 312, 313–18 (1973).
34. See DAVID GODDARD, CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 27 (C.E.F.
Rickett & R. Grantham eds. 1998).
35. Keay, supra note 30, at 578
36. Id.
37. Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited 
Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980).
38. NACEPF v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–02 (Del. 2007). See also Quadrant Structured 
Prods. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 545–47 (Del. Ch. 2015).
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ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation. As seen below, however, which 
stakeholder becomes the rightful beneficiary at a particular point in time varies 
depending on the financial condition of the company and the level of risk borne 
by such stakeholder.
B. Scope of Review
This Comment looks at the debate as it has played out in the legal jurispru-
dence of the U.S. and the U.K.. The analysis of each considers the three finan-
cial stages of a corporation’s existence that are specifically addressed in the de-
bate today, i.e.: (i) solvency; (ii) insolvency; and (iii) the zone of insolvency.
After setting out the current position, this Comment specifically address the var-
ious shortcomings and criticisms of the models adopted by each jurisdiction and 
offers observations on the status quo and the implementation of these models.
On this basis, this Comment goes on to propose a model to be adopted by India, 
the Indian legal jurisprudence in this respect still being in its evolutionary stages 
and lacking the depth and the level of analysis found in the West.
The common practice in India is to look to the U.K. and the U.S. for guid-
ance in drafting statutes and resolving complex legal issues that arise thereaf-
ter.39 Being a member of the Commonwealth, Indian courts benefit from deci-
sions and legal developments in other common law jurisdictions. Indian courts 
often directly cite U.K. decisions in their judgments in order to fill gaps in the 
domestic framework. Drawing from either of these jurisdictions would result in 
benefits for India, owing to their rich, highly developed, and nuanced corporate 
and insolvency law jurisprudence.
The U.S. and the U.K. offer different models of corporate fiduciary duties.
Each model has evolved by way of judicial interpretation.  During the evolu-
tionary process, nuanced features of each model have developed differently de-
pending on the corresponding evolutionary trajectory of corporate governance 
and insolvency law principles. Several amendments have come about as a re-
sult of trial and error as well as repeated reprioritization warranted by changing 
economic and business scenarios. The respective models also derive their color 
from the character of the insolvency regimes themselves. The U.S. adopts a 
debtor-friendly regime, while the U.K. (and also recently, India) adopts a credi-
tor-friendly approach. Thus, each model differs in several respects and offers 
different perspectives on how to approach the issue of fiduciary duties.
This Comment seeks to provide suggestions for the way forward for India 
by drawing from the experience of the U.S. and the U.K., and by laying out a 
model that would adopt the most efficient and suitable aspects of both ap-
proaches, while learning from the failures of both. It should also be noted that 
the U.S. analysis will focus primarily on the State of Delaware, Delaware courts 
39. See e.g., Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (Writ Petition (Criminal) 
No. 76 of 2016).
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having delved into this issue in a substantial manner, and most large U.S. corpo-
rations being incorporated in Delaware.40
In addition to discussing fiduciary duties, this Comment also touches upon 
certain statutory provisions that create duties analogous to fiduciary duties, 
which operate to protect the interests of the relevant stakeholders in a similar 
manner during the various stages of a company’s financial existence set out 
above.
C. Fiduciary Duties
Before entering into a substantive analysis and a comparison of the legal 
position in the above-mentioned jurisdictions, a brief introduction to fiduciary 
duties is warranted. Fiduciary duties are said to operate by “filling up the gaps”
in the contractual underpinnings of a corporation’s day-to-day functioning.41
They are also meant to counter the inherent tendency of a corporation’s man-
agement towards self-preservation.42 Although courts have not set out any 
comprehensive definition of what constitutes a “fiduciary,” in Bristol and West 
Building Society v. Mathew43, it was said that, “[a] fiduciary is someone who 
undertakes to act for or on behalf of another in a particular manner in circum-
stances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.”44 A fiduciary 
is said to be in violation of his or her duties not only where there has been pur-
poseful intent to harm the economic interests of the beneficiaries, but also 
where he or she has not acted in a way that will subjectively advance their inter-
ests.45
Fiduciary duties apply to directors managing the affairs of a company as 
representatives of various stakeholder interests.46 The primary fiduciary duties 
of U.S. directors are the duties of care and loyalty. The duty of care obligates 
U.S. directors to adopt a manner of functioning that “ordinarily careful and pru-
dent men would use in similar circumstances”.47 The duty of loyalty, on the 
other hand, obligates such directors to make decisions that are aligned to the 
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and disallows them from 
40. See Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. OF FIN. ECON.
525–58 (2001).
41. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991).
42. See Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. & ECON. 305 (1976).
43. Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew, [1996] EWCA (Civ) 533 (Eng.) (hereinaf-
ter “Bristol and West Building”).
44. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
45. Pitt v. Holt, [2013] 2 AC 108, at 73 [Pitt].
46. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services 
Ltd., [1983] Ch 258.
47. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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acting in pursuance of their self-interest.48 It requires that directors retain an 
undivided and selfless loyalty to the corporation.49 Justice Cardozo described 
the duty of loyalty as constituting “something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace.”50 The duty requires that directors inter alia refrain from compet-
ing with the corporation, usurping corporate opportunities51 or assets, and bene-
fitting from non-public information.52
In the U.K., the fiduciary duty of loyalty is encapsulated under Sections 172 
through 179 of the Companies Act, 2006 (“Companies Act”), which is dis-
cussed in greater detail as part of the U.K. analysis below. The duty to exercise 
“reasonable care and skill” is not a fiduciary duty recognized under U.K. law 
(as expressly stated under Section 178(2) of the Companies Act).53 The com-
mon law remedy for breach of duty of care is in the nature of damages instead, 
thereby necessitating an assessment of causation, remoteness, and measure.54 A
breach of this duty may also result in disqualification of a director under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986 (“Disqualification Act”).55 Un-
der the Indian framework, both the duty of loyalty and the duty of reasonable 
care find their place in the Indian Companies Act statutory framework.56
While fiduciary duties owed to shareholders contemplate actions that max-
imize the value of the firm and the possible dividend that would accrue to its 
shareholders, fiduciary duties to creditors are more expansive and include inter 
alia avoiding transactions that diminish, divert, or expose the company’s assets 
to risk as well as avoiding preferential and fraudulent transactions.57 A viola-
tion of fiduciary duties would result in the personal liability of directors. Alt-
hough most directors are covered by liability insurance, some courts have held 
that a portion of claim amounts or settlements must come from directors them-
selves.58
Although the scope of fiduciary duties is rather wide, several jurisdictions 
create an exception to their applicability in situations where the impugned deci-
48. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d. Cir. 1984); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361–62 (Del. 1993).
49. Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939) [hereinafter “Guth”].
50. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
51. See Liston v. Gottsegen, 348 F.3d 294, 303 (1st Cir. 2003).
52. John A. Pearce II & Ilya A. Lipin, The Duties of Directors and Officers within the Fuzzy 
Zone of Insolvency, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361, 365 (2011).
53. This is one of the causes for problems when the breach constitutes an overlap of both 
types of duties, however.
54. See Bristol & West Building, supra note 43, at 711.
55. Section 6 read with Schedule 1 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986.
56. Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, India Code (2013), §§ 166, 184.
57. See generally Pearce II & Lipin, supra note 52 (discussing fiduciary duties owed to cred-
itors in a variety of situations).
58. Shawn Young, Ex-WorldCom Directors Reach Pact, WALL ST. J. A6, Mar. 21, 2006; 
Rebecca Smith & Jonathan Weil, Ex-Enron Directors Reach Settlement, WALL ST. J. C3, Jan. 10, 
2005.
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sion/action has been taken by directors in “good faith” and what they believed 
was in the best interest of the beneficiaries and the corporation.59 In the U.S., 
this exception finds its place in the legal framework under the nomenclature of 
the “business judgment rule.” Under the business judgment rule, directors are 
accorded immunity against all losses arising due to errors of judgment, so long 
as the impugned decisions are attributable to an objective commercial pur-
pose.60 Once applied, this rule shifts the burden of proof from the directors onto 
the party challenging the impugned decision.61
As described by the Delaware Supreme Court, the business judgment rule 
exists to protect and promote the “full and free exercise of the managerial pow-
er”62 available to directors. In determining whether to apply the rule, courts 
consider several mitigating factors, including: (i) whether the concerned direc-
tor has made reasonable efforts to apprise himself or herself of the relevant 
facts;63 (ii) whether the director was under the belief that the impugned action 
was in furtherance of the interests of the corporation and its relevant stakehold-
ers;64 (iii) the pro-activeness of the director in addressing the issues resulting in 
the loss caused to the company;65 (iv) reliance on professional services66 (unless 
it can be said that the director had access to additional material that would call 
into question the legitimacy of the opinion given by the professional);67 and (v) 
state-specific carve-outs, etc.68
There are certain situations which preclude application of the rule. One ex-
ample is where the director has a personal interest. In such situations, a higher 
standard applies: the “entire” or “intrinsic” fairness of the decision to the inter-
ests of the corporation.69 The U.K. has not adopted a legislated business judg-
ment rule (nor has India), but relies upon similar protections to directors under 
59. Carlos Andres Laguado Girlado, Factors Governing the Application of the Business 
Judgment Rule: An Empirical Study of the US, UK, Australia and the EU, 111 VNIVERSITAS, 
115, 125–46 (2006); Chia Yaru, The Business of Judging Directors’ Business Judgments in Singa-
pore Courts, 28  SINGAPORE ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 428 (2016).
60. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 872 (Del. 2003) [hereinafter 
“Omnicare”].
61. See Hugh McCullough & Marshall Huebner, The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Trou-




62. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 848, 872 (Del. 1985).
63. Id; see also Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 925–26 (Del. Ch. 1987).
64. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999).
65. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
66. See Munford, Inc. v. Valuation Res. Co., 98 F.3d 604, 611 (11th Cir. 1996).
67. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healtcho International), 208 B.R. 288, 306–07 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).].
68. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: 
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117(5) COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017).
69. See McCullough & Huebner, supra note 61.
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common law. In Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum70 and the line of cases 
that followed, it was held that:
[i]t would be wrong for the court to substitute its opinion for that of the manage-
ment, or indeed to question the correctness of the management’s decision, on such 
a question, if bona fide arrived at. There is no appeal on merits from management 
decisions to courts of law; nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervi-
sory board over decisions within powers of management honestly arrived at.71
Apart from the duties mentioned above, the U.K., by way of the landmark 
decision in Pitt v. Holt in 2012, included the additional duty for directors to 
consider relevant matters (and disregard irrelevant matters) when exercising de-
cision making powers.72
II. THE UNITED STATES
A. Duties in Financial Stability
In the U.S., directors’ fiduciary duties are predicated on primacy of the 
shareholders (apart from the corporation itself).73 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.74
illustrates this concept:
[A] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, 
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to 
the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.
Courts in the U.S. have reiterated this position over time,75 including the 
Delaware Chancery Court in the landmark decision of Katz v. Oak Industries 
Co.76 Thus, in the U.S., the directors of a solvent corporation do not ordinarily 
owe any duties to bondholders or creditors77 because “the relationship between 
a corporation and the holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt securi-
70. Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821 PC (UK).
71. Id. at 832.
72. Pitt v. Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108.
73. See United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996); Newby v. Enron Corp, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 684, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939); Unocal Corp v.
Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
74. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
75. See Revlon Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Polk 
v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del.
1985); In re Abbott Labs, Derivative Shareholders Litigation, 325 F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 2003); In 
re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 
300, 304 (Del. 1988); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1417 (3d. Cir. 1933).
76. Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
77. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524–25 
(S.D.N.Y 1989).
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ties, is contractual in nature.”78 Further, even any extra-contractual rights that 
accrue to creditors are said to arise only from an “implied covenant of good 
faith” that is said to be found in all contracts.79 In Katz,80 it was held that such 
an implied covenant would only be breached when the impugned act is prohib-
ited by the express terms of the indenture. In a later case,81 it was clarified that 
this implied covenant could not, in any event, be extended to protect against 
acts in a manner that would be inconsistent with the other terms of the contrac-
tual agreement. Creditors’ only recourse against directors of financially stable 
companies is by way of suits alleging fraud, and resorting to remedies available 
under state statutes and federal securities law. Unlike shareholders, they cannot 
rely on the “special and rare” obligations imposed on fiduciaries.82 Thus, direc-
tors constantly face the risk of suits by shareholders for granting creditors great-
er rights than they are entitled to and have to be constantly wary of overstepping 
in this regard.83
It did not take long for U.S. courts to realize that such an analysis would not
be equally applicable in insolvency scenarios.  In insolvency, the shareholder 
primacy approach no longer seemed relevant, as shareholders were no longer 
the primary risk bearers of the corporation, this role shifting to the creditors in-
stead.84 It was found that the Katz85 justification of protection to creditors con-
tinuing by way of contractual covenants also lost its relevance in insolvency, 
wherein creditors would find it increasingly difficult to enforce their contractual 
rights.86 This is coupled with the fact that insolvent corporations are also af-
forded additional protection against actions by creditors. The analysis pertain-
ing to fiduciary duties owed by directors in insolvency and in the ‘vicinity of 
insolvency’ is set out below.
B. Duties in Insolvency
As set out above, U.S. courts started recognizing the problem with accord-
ing primacy to shareholders in insolvency during the early 1980s. Courts be-
came increasingly aware of the fact that interests of shareholders become sub-
ordinate to the rights of creditors in insolvency and that shareholders stand last 
78. Katz, 508 A.2d at 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.
1996).
79. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 345.
80. Katz, 508 A.2d at 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).
81. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y 
1989).
82. Id. at 1524.
83. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 958 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 41.
85. Katz, 508 A.2d at 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
86. See Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over 
Corporate Bondholder Rights, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 26–28 (1989).
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in line during liquidation.87 In light of this, courts concluded that, upon insol-
vency, directors owed their fiduciary duties: (i) to the firm’s creditors instead,88
or (ii) in priority to creditors over shareholders.89 In addition, courts felt that it 
was necessary to accord certain protections to preserve the asset value of the 
company in favor of creditors, who are solely reliant on the assets of the corpo-
ration for recovering their claim amounts.90 Thus, the rules of the game 
changed drastically in favor of creditors, who were until then largely unprotect-
ed. As a result, creditors were now allowed to bring direct claims against the 
directors for breach of fiduciary duties in insolvency. While blanket rights were 
accorded at first,91 they were subsequently watered down to provide only for 
those situations where there was a “marked degree of animus towards a particu-
lar creditor.”92
This was all to change with the 2007 Delaware Supreme Court decision in 
North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc. v. Ghee-
walla.93 In Gheewalla, the Court expressly did away with the rights of credi-
tors to initiate direct claims against directors for breach of fiduciary duties in 
insolvency.94 It held that:
[I]t is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the cor-
poration and its shareholders. While shareholders rely on directors acting as fidu-
ciaries to protect their interests, creditors are afforded protection through contractu-
al agreements, fraud and fraudulent conveyance law, implied covenants of good 
faith and fair dealing, bankruptcy law, general commercial law and other sources of 
creditor rights. Delaware courts have traditionally been reluctant to expand fiduci-
ary duties. Accordingly, ‘the general rule is that directors do not owe creditors du-
ties beyond the relevant contractual terms.95
Thus, the Gheewalla decision reverted to a Katz type understanding in its 
justification for holding that directors do not directly owe fiduciary obligations 
87. Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enterprises Inc. v. Noyes, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d 
Cir. 1985); In re Sec. Asset Capital Corp., 396 B.R. 35, 42 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2008).
88. See FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1982); Henderson v. Bu-
chanan (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 753–62 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Carrieri 
v. Jobs.com, Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 534 (5th Cir. 2004); Arnold v. Knapp, 84 S.E. 895, 899 (W.Va.
1915); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Comp., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
89. Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, B.M. v. Sunbelt Indus., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Ga.
1980).
90. See Richard M. Cieri and Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of Corpo-
rations That Are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important Considerations, Prac-
tical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 295 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corpo-
ration’s Obligation to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 666 (1995).
91. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp, 1991 WL 
277613 109 (Del. Ch. 1991).
92. Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch. 2004).
93. 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007).
94. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
95. Id.
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to creditors as a constituency. Its rationale was that creditors are protected by 
pre-existing contractual covenants. Recognizing the dilemma that directors 
might face by extending such direct duties to creditors, the court held that:
[R]ecognizing that directors of an insolvent corporation owe direct fiduciary duties 
to creditors, would create uncertainty for directors who have a fiduciary duty to ex-
ercise their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent corporation. To 
recognize a new right for creditors to bring direct claims against those directors 
would create a conflict between those directors’ duty to maximize the value of the 
insolvent corporation for the breach of all those having an interest in it, and the 
newly recognized direct fiduciary duty to individual creditors.96
As an extension of this principle, the court ruled that although creditors no 
longer had the right to initiate direct claims against directors in insolvency, they 
still retained the right to bring derivative claims (on behalf of the corporation) 
against its directors. In this regard, the court held:
[T]he corporation’s insolvency makes the creditors the principal constituency in-
jured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm’s value. Therefore, equitable 
considerations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against the direc-
tors of an insolvent corporation. Individual creditors of an insolvent corporation 
have the same incentive to pursue valid derivative claims on its behalf that share-
holders have when the corporation is solvent.97
Thus, the court’s rationale in barring direct claims was founded in the un-
derstanding that creditors are to take the place of shareholders upon insolvency, 
and thus their standing to proceed against the company should be the same as 
that of shareholders’, i.e., bringing suits against directors only on behalf of the 
corporation itself. As seen from the paragraphs quoted above, the court in 
Gheewala98 reaffirmed the fundamental principle that duties are never to be 
owed to the company’s stakeholders directly, the primary duty of directors al-
ways being towards the enterprise itself. As a result, stakeholders are only enti-
tled to initiate derivative actions against the directors where their decisions have 
had an adverse impact on the company, and where they are in a vulnerable posi-
tion as risk bearers, demonstrated by the fact that fiduciary duties are owed to 
them at the relevant point in time. This would empower creditors to prevent 
corporations from taking risky business decisions in insolvency that would di-
rectly affect their interests due to their implied recognition as the primary risk 
bearers of the corporation in insolvency.
There is a presumption under Delaware law in favor of directors fulfilling 
their duties of care and loyalty even during insolvency.99 In other words, the 
business judgment rule continues to be applicable in insolvency. In this regard, 
96. Id. at 23.
97. NACEPF v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–02 (Del. 2007).
98. Id.
99. See In re Ultimate Escapes Holdings, LLC, Case No. 12-50849 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 12, 
2014).
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the court in Gheewalla100 clarified that in endeavoring to increase the likelihood
that creditors get a greater recovery, the directors do not become guarantors of 
success.101 This is demonstrable by the fact that the statutory framework pro-
vides for the management of the company to continue to vest with directors post 
insolvency and that directors continue to take important decisions, including 
those regarding whether to commence a court-supervised reorganization post 
insolvency.102
Thus, fiduciary obligations to creditors act as gap-fillers where the statutory 
requirements of fraudulent conveyance or voidable preference laws are not met 
and encompass a large number of actions that would adversely affect the inter-
ests of creditors.103 Further, this opens up an additional avenue for creditors to 
go up against directors who have not personally benefitted from the impugned 
transactions, but who have played a role in approving the transaction, or did not 
actively object.104 As an empirical matter, however, cases in which directors 
have been found to have breached their fiduciary duties to creditors have mostly 
been observed to have been initiated where corporations involved have been ei-
ther closely held105 or under common control and ownership.106107
C. Duties in the Vicinity/Zone of Insolvency
A company is said to be in the zone of insolvency during the “indeterminate 
period that exists between its solvency and insolvency.”108 From a corporate 
governance perspective, the determination of whom directors owe their alle-
giance to in the zone could lead to very different outcomes for the corporation.
This would affect not only the day-to-day operations of a company in a state of 
financial decline but would even influence how important decisions regarding 
the turn-around of the firm are taken. The entire “vicinity debate” was first ad-
dressed in the landmark decision of the Delaware Chancery Court in Credit 
Lyonnais.109 In Credit Lyonnais,110 it  was held that “[a]t least where a corpora-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. McCullough and Huebner, supra note 61, at 7.
103. Lin, supra note 6, at 1508.
104. Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367, 372(Colo. App. 1977).
105. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215 (7th
Cir. 1976); South Falls Corp. v. Rochelle, 329 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1964).
106. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1951); Automatic Canteen 
Co. of Am. V. Wharton, 358 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Holly Hill Medical Ctr., Inc., 53 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1985).
107. Lin, supra note 6, at 1518.
108. Gloria Chon, Will the Courts Protect the Boards? Defending the Board of a Michigan 
Corporation in the “Zone of Insolvency”, 53 WAYNE L. REV 1085, 1087 (2007).
109. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp.,1991 WL 277613 
109 (Del. Ch. 1991); see also In re Healthco International, 208 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
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tion is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely 
the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes it duty to the corporate enter-
prise.” Here, it was held that the obligation of directors in the zone of insolven-
cy was to “the community of interests that sustained the corporation, to exercise 
judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation’s long-
term wealth creating capacity.”111 Different courts interpreted this holding dif-
ferently. Some courts remained fixated with the notion that it is only the corpo-
rate enterprise that is owed duties and that no duties are owed to creditors di-
rectly.112 Others read the decision much more expansively as introducing 
primary duties to creditors in the zone.113 Such an interpretation was based on 
the understanding that creditors are owed duties as part of the “community of 
interests” that was referred to by the court.114 Thus, this interpretation consti-
tuted a “doctrinal innovation” that starkly differed from the pre-existing legal 
position in Delaware.115 This obligated directors to account for the legitimate 
claims of all the company’s constituents/ stakeholders in their endeavor to max-
imize value.
There are several possible justifications for the court having expanded di-
rectors’ obligations to include creditors in the vicinity of insolvency. These in-
clude the “trust fund doctrine”116 (i.e., that directors of corporations in financial 
difficulty act as trustees for its corporate assets, with the creditors as the benefi-
ciaries of the trust), and the “at risk doctrine” (i.e., creditors are deserving of 
such duties, all downside risks being borne by them at such time). At the same 
time, the holding in Credit Lyonnais117 resulted in several unwanted and unfa-
vorable outcomes.  Although the ruling (even in its wider interpretation) was 
meant to act as a “shield” for directors, in that they could be granted immunity 
for actions taken for the benefit of the “community of interests” of the corpora-
tion, it ended up being used by creditors as a “sword” in order to scrutinize ac-
tions taken by directors in the zone of insolvency, and to bring direct claims 
110. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 WL 277613 109 
(Del. Ch. 1991).
111. Id. at 34.
112. Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 582–84 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Comm. of Unsecured Cred-
itors of Buckhead America Corp. v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc.(In re Buckhead America Crop.),178 
B.R. 956, 968–69 (D. Del. 1994); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del.
2003); Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Commc’ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221 (Del. Ch. 2002).
113. See Weaver, 216 B.R. at 582; see also In Re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R., 713, 
735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1997).
114. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 WL 277613 
109 (Del. Ch. 1991). See also Asaro LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 395, 415 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
115. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 9.
116. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (1st Cir. 1824).
117. Credit Lyonnais Bank, 1991 WL 277613 at 109.
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against directors for such actions.118 Directors were thus left vulnerable and 
open to attack by creditors when the firm entered a state of financial deteriora-
tion and had to completely alter their functioning and management of the com-
pany. The issue was exacerbated by the fact that the boundary of the zone of 
insolvency itself remained marred by ambiguity.
The Delaware Court of Chancery stepped in to clarify the issue in Produc-
tion Resources,119 and rejected the idea that Credit Lyonnais120 had created “a
new body of creditors’ rights law.”121 The court held that creditors were not to 
be afforded duties in the zone of insolvency, as they were already protected by 
contractual covenants, and that enforcing such duties would “fill gaps that do 
not exist.”122 The court clarified that even upon entering the zone, directors 
would only continue to owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation, and that 
creditors did not have the right to initiate direct claims against the corpora-
tion.123 The court thus did away with the new movement towards creditors’
rights that had been initiated by Credit Lyonnais,124 and specifically clarified 
that the judgment was only meant to operate as a “shield” for directors.125
The Chancery Court reaffirmed this stance again in Trenwick America,126
wherein the court held that there could be no logical reason to extend such pro-
tections to creditors in addition to the contractual covenants by which they are 
already protected.127 Despite that, the court in Production Resources128 did 
hold that directors may (but are not obligated to) consider the rights of non-
shareholder constituencies in the vicinity of insolvency in certain situations.129
For this, however, the directors would have to display a “marked degree of ani-
mus towards a particular creditor,” and it would have to be demonstrated that 
the best interests of the corporation were at stake in respect of the decision.130
While these cases did away with creditors’ rights to bring direct actions against 
directors, creditors nevertheless retained their rights to bring derivative suits.131
118. Brian E. Geer, Fiduciary Duties When the Corporation is in the Zone of Insolvency, 25 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 56 (2006).
119. Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 792 (Del. Ch. 2004).
120. Credit Lyonnais Bank, 1991 WL 277613 at 109.
121. Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 787–88 (Del. Ch. 2004).
122. Id. at 29.
123. Id. at 792.
124. Credit Lyonnais Bank, 1991 WL 277613 at 109.
125. Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004).
126. Trenwick AmericaLitigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 218 (Del.
Ch. 2006).
127. Id. at ¶ 198.
128. Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
129. Id. at 787–88.
130. Id. at 798.
131. Id. at 776.
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While Gheewalla132 overruled Production Resources133 to the extent that it 
permitted creditors to bring direct claims against a corporation during actual in-
solvency (as stated in the previous section), it re-affirmed its holding to the ex-
tent that it disallowed direct claims by creditors in the vicinity of insolvency:
[t]he need for providing directors with definitive guidance compels us to hold that 
no direct claim for breach of fiduciary duties may be asserted by the creditors of a 
solvent corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency. When a solvent 
corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for Delaware direc-
tors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation and its shareholders by exercising business judgment.134
Thus, the court clarified the following with respect to a corporation operat-
ing in the zone: (i) the company’s creditors lack standing to bring direct claims 
against it;135 (ii) the company’s shareholders remain its residual claimants and 
thereby the primary focus of directors and their fiduciary duties; and (iii) direc-
tors continue to be afforded the protection of the business judgment rule for de-
cisions made in the zone.136 The court held that any benefit of allowing credi-
tors to initiate direct claims against the company’s directors would be greatly 
outweighed by the “disruption of the established corporate governance mecha-
nism.”137
However, unlike the case in actual insolvency, the court did not expressly 
hold that creditors were afforded the right to bring derivative claims against the 
corporation in the zone. This results in a situation where creditors could be said 
to be ineligible to prosecute directors for a breach of fiduciary duties in the 
zone, whether directly or indirectly. Such an interpretation of Gheewalla was 
upheld in Torch Liquidating Trust ex rel. Bridge Assocs., LLC v. Stockstill, re-
garding a Louisiana state court decision.138
On a separate note, certain state courts have taken a divergent view to that 
in Gheewala that creditors of a company in the zone retain their standing to 
bring direct claims against its directors.139 Such decisions are not technically 
per incuriam owing to the fact that Credit Lyonnais remains to be expressly 
overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court or by way of federal legislation.
In addition to the ruling on the continuing applicability of the business judg-
132. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
133. Production Resources Group, 863 A.2d at 79.
134. North American Catholic, 2006 WL 2588971 at 12.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at ¶12.
138. 561 F.3d 377, 386 (5th Cir. 2009).
139. See, e.g., Jetpay Merch. Servs., L.L.C. v. Miller, No. 3:07-CV-0950-G, 2007 WL 
2701636, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2007).
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ment rule in the zone,140 the court also clarified that “deepening insolvency”141
could not constitute a cause of action for any of the company’s stakeholders ip-
so facto.142 This position was also reaffirmed in Trenwick,143 wherein it was 
held:
Delaware law does not recognize this catchy term as a cause of action, because 
catchy though the term may be, it does not express a coherent concept. Even when 
a firm is insolvent, its directors may, in the appropriate exercise of their business 
judgment, take action that might, if it does not pan out, result in the firm being 
painted in a deeper hue of red. The fact that the residual claimants of the firm at 
that time are creditors does not mean that the directors cannot choose to continue 
the firm’s operations in the hope that they can expand the inadequate pie such that 
the firm’s creditors get a greater recovery. By doing so, the directors do not be-
come a guarantor of success. Put simply, under Delaware law, “deepening insol-
vency” is no more of a cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause of ac-
tion for “shallowing profitability” would be when a firm is solvent.144
Therefore, even in situations where the firm’s finances are depleting, directors 
may take actions that end up painting the corporation in a “deeper hue of 
red.”145
The decision in Gheewalla146 aims to tackle several dilemmas that previous-
ly plagued the minds of directors managing corporate enterprises. First, it was a 
rather arduous task for any director to determine, at all times, whether his or her 
company was headed towards insolvency, owing to the multiple tests in place to 
determine the occurrence of insolvency under U.S. law.147 In this regard, direc-
tors remained unsure of which date a judge might finally deem to have been the 
commencement of the onset of insolvency.148 The revised approach does away 
140. Earlier cases favoring application of the rule have included Angelo Gordon & Co. L.P. v.
Allied Riser Comm. Corp, 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002); and Comm. Of Creditors of Xonics 
Med. Sys., Inc v. Haverty (In Re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). On the other 
hand, cases which have held the rule not to apply (on the basis that directors and officers are “trus-
tees” of the creditors of the corporation) have included Geren v. Quantum Chem. Corp., , 832 F.
Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); and Jewel Recovery L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 351 (N.D. Tex.
1996).
141. This had earlier been identified as a trigger for directors to be held liable. See Stephen 
M. Packman, Directors and Officers in the Zone of Insolvency: Take actions with caution to avoid 
personal exposure, 193 N.J. L.J. 450 (2008).
142. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007); See also Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 
A.2d 168, 200 (Del. Ch. 2006).
143. Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 168 (Del.
Ch. 2006).
144. Id. at 174.
145. Id.
146. See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
147. In Re Healthco Int’l, 208 B.R. 288, 303 (Bankr. D. Mass.1997) (holding that a corpora-
tion was in the “zone”, when its financial condition was such that the conveyance would run the risk 
of leaving the corporation with unreasonably small capital).
148. McCullough & Huebner, supra note 61.
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with the “triggering” inquiry to an extent, as directors continue to owe their du-
ties to the corporation and its shareholders up until the triggering of actual in-
solvency of the enterprise. However, the issue subsists to the extent that there 
continues to be ambiguity surrounding the question of whether creditors have 
the right to initiate derivative claims in the zone, as discussed below.149 Sec-
ond, and as an extension of the first point, directors can rest easy and no longer 
have to be apprehensive about which constituency might ultimately initiate ac-
tions against them and no longer remain conflicted regarding where to focus 
their energies.150 In the past, directors were subject to actions initiated by 
shareholders while looking out for creditor interests151 and vice versa.152 Third, 
transactions are rarely neatly classified into the “high-risk, high-reward” binary 
in a manner that would enable directors to decide whether to favor creditors or 
shareholders by simply relying on the difference in their risk appetites.153 As 
discussed in the section below however, these concerns have not yet been fully 
allayed.
Post-Gheewalla, courts of other states also reached similar conclusions with 
respect to the duties owed by directors in the zone. For instance, a California 
court, in Berg & Berg Enterprises LLC v. Boyle,154 held that directors owe no 
direct fiduciary duty to creditors simply by virtue of the fact that the company 
was in the zone.155 This holding again was based on the logic that such a duty 
would be in conflict with duties owed by directors to the stockholders and the 
corporation under state legislation and common law, and that duties towards 
creditors would only be triggered off upon actual insolvency.
D. Criticisms and Observations
The legal position in the U.S. with respect to directors’ fiduciary duties is 
not without problems. These pertain both to the theoretical framework that has 
evolved over time as well as the implementation of the model in practice. This 
section deals specifically with the criticisms of the U.S. model pertaining to fi-
duciary duties owed in: (i) the vicinity of insolvency; and (ii) actual insolvency.
As the approach adopted by the U.S. in financial stability is largely aligned with 
the U.K. approach, and owing to the fact that this Comment deals extensively 
with the criticisms of the same under the U.K. section, I do not specifically ad-
dress the U.S. position on duties in financial stability in this section.
149. Kandestin, supra note 16, 1244.
150. See McCullough & Huebner, supra note 61.
151. See In re Buckhead America Corp., 178 B.R. 956, at 960 (D. Del. 1994).
152. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at ¶ 20.
153. McCullough & Huebner, supra note 61, at 8.
154. Berg & Berg Enter., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
155. Some state courts have continued to abide by the earlier position, i.e. fiduciary duties are 
owed to creditors in the zone of insolvency. See 3 Point Holdings LLC v. Gulf South Solutions, LLC, 
Civil Action No. 06-10902, 2008 WL 695379 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2008).
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1. Vicinity of Insolvency
A major criticism regarding the model applicable to U.S. companies in the 
zone is that there is no bright-line test to determine what constitutes the “zone.”
Former Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Norman Veasey strongly criti-
cized the confusion this lack of clarity causes in the minds of directors when the
company is in a state of financial decline.156 In fact, the Delaware Chancery 
Court in Production Resources itself commented that there existed no “magic 
dividing line” to identify the zone of insolvency.157
This causes immense problems, including the possibility of a company be-
ing deemed to be in the zone despite being in perfectly good financial health.
As noted by Frederick Tung, “all firms are always in the zone of insolvency be-
cause managers can always find a sizeable enough bet that puts all the firm’s
equity at risk.”158 This would be especially true if one were to apply a test simi-
lar to the one laid down in Brandt v. Micks to determine whether a company has 
breached the zone (i.e., where a transaction would run the risk of leaving the 
corporation with “unreasonably small capital”).159 The confusion in this respect 
is severely compounded due to the fact that Gheewalla did not expressly rule on 
whether creditors have a right to bring derivative claims in the zone (although it 
specifically ruled on the permissibility to do so in actual insolvency).160 Reso-
lution of this question is absolutely fundamental to bring clarity to directors of 
financially unstable companies.
If creditors are permitted to bring derivative claims in the zone, directors 
would be subjected to the onerous task of catering to the interests of both share-
holders and creditors simultaneously—the “two-masters conundrum”161—
because Gheewala expressly ruled that fiduciary duties continue to be owed to 
the shareholders in the zone.162 As a result, a mistaken belief that the company 
is solvent when it is in fact in the zone could lead to grave consequences for di-
rectors.163 It is also uncertain whether directors will be entitled to the benefits 
of directors and officers liability insurance in such situations because such poli-
cies commonly contain “insured-versus-insured” exclusions.164 By adopting 
156. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corpo-
rate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1429–32 (2005).
157. Production Resources, 863 A.2d at 787 n.52.
158. Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 607, 623 
(2007).
159. In re Healthco International, 208 B.R. 288, 302 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
160. Anna Manasco Dionne, Living on the Edge, Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment and 
Expensive Uncertainty in the Zone of Insolvency, 13 STAN J. L. BUS & FIN. 188, 188 (2007).
161. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 156.
162. Dionne, supra note 160.
163. Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corpo-
rations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV., 45, 66–71(1998).
164. Bernard Black Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1119 (2006).
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such an interpretation, the legal position effectively reverts to the “middle-path”
approach brought about in Production Resources and would mean that creditors 
are continued to be owed fiduciary duties (having the right to initiate derivative 
claims for any breach).
At the same time, the middle-path approach also incentivizes directors to 
pursue self-interest in the garb of furthering the company’s cause.165 Further, 
owing to the inherent conflict that exists between the two competing constituen-
cies who stand to gain at the cost of the other, it is unlikely that any claim made 
against directors will ever be truly “derivative” and not in pursuit of the claim-
ant’s own self-interest.166
Whether creditors deserve to be accorded the protection of fiduciary duties 
in the zone can also be debated at a policy level without getting into the intrica-
cies of the implementation of such a model. This boils down to the question of 
whether creditors deserve such additional protection over and above the vast 
array of contractual rights that they are given as a matter of practice, as dis-
cussed in Production Resources and Gheewalla.
On the one hand, it has been argued that by adding fiduciary duties to the 
mix, creditors stand to gain a windfall that they never bargained for,167 now 
having ex post access to tools that were not available to them to begin with.168
Next, as stated by Kandestin, directors have not yet adopted the role of credi-
tors’ trustees in the zone, and the trust fund doctrine cannot be extended to the 
zone in this manner.169 Further, the threat that shareholders may become risk-
prone and gamble away the corporation’s money may not constitute sufficient 
cause to move away from a shareholder-centric approach prior to insolvency; 
this being said to be a privilege that accrues to shareholders as an integral fea-
ture of their contracts (as owners of the corporation).170 According creditors the 
benefit of fiduciary duties at this stage may incentivize them to refrain from 
contracting ex ante, but to simply take advantage of the enforcement tools made 
available to them in financial distress (of the corporation).171 Creditors would 
also be in a position to sue merely on the basis that the board’s strategies for the 
corporation turned out to be unsuccessful, finding themselves in an “irresistible”
position.172
On the other hand, it is disputable whether all creditors are adequately cov-
ered or protected by contractual covenants. It is also problematic to ignore the 
165. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organiza-
tion, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001); Bainbridge, supra note 12.
166. See Lin, supra note 6.
167. Bainbridge, supra note 12.
168. See Dionne, supra note 160.
169. See Kandestin, supra note 16.
170. Bainbridge, supra note 12.
171. Tung, supra note 158, at 626.
172. Roger A. Lane, Direct Creditor Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Is they is, or is 
they ain’t? A Practitioner’s Notes From the Field, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 483, 485 (2007).
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tendency of shareholders towards short-termism in the zone, the incentive of 
shareholders to make risky decisions being the greatest at this point of time. As 
a corollary, the trust fund doctrine should be applied at this stage. Thus, even if 
an additional benefit was to accrue to creditors over and above their contractual 
rights, the level of risk borne by creditors in the zone would outweigh any con-
cerns of misuse of such rights.
On a separate note, it should be noted that the justification adopted by the 
court in Production Resources and Gheewalla to refuse extension of duties to 
creditors in the zone is based on a false assumption that all types of creditors are 
equally placed and can rely on existing contractual protections. This sort of 
analysis is prejudicial to creditors who do not have the bargaining power to ne-
gotiate such arrangements, as well as involuntary creditors (individuals or cor-
porations, whose claim against the corporation arises by way of a court awarded 
judgment for damages, for instance).173
2. Actual Insolvency
Unlike the case with respect to the zone, the legislative framework in the 
U.S. does provide for certain trigger-based tests to determine the commence-
ment of actual insolvency. The problem in this regard is one of plenty.174 Ow-
ing to the multiplicity of tests that exist under U.S. law to determine the com-
mencement of insolvency, there is not enough clarity to appropriately guide 
directors regarding the nature and the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties. To 
make matters worse, courts have held that they are empowered to determine 
whether a company was truly insolvent at the time the impugned actions were 
taken, “notwithstanding contrary presentations made in the company’s audited 
financial statements or made to its board of directors.”175
All of this also adds to the uncertainty in the minds of potential litigants (be-
ing the aggrieved members of the relevant constituency of the company), who 
stay wary of incurring unnecessary expenditure in situations where it is unclear 
whether they are the rightful beneficiaries of the directors’ duties.176 This may 
also have the opposite effect, where large and cash-rich creditors bring frivolous 
lawsuits and benefit from the ambiguity of the test just to pressurize directors 
173. Janis Sarra, Wise People, Fiduciary Obligation and Reviewable Transactions, Director’s
Liability to Creditors, in SARA JANIS, ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW (Toronto: Carswell, 
2011).
174. Both the cash flow test and the balance sheet test have been applied in different contexts 
under US law. As discussed later in the paper, some US courts have also deemed the company to be 
insolvent when a particular transaction leaves the company with an “unreasonably small amount of 
capital”.
175. Official C. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In re R.M.L., Inc.),
187, B.R. 455, ¶ 80 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995).
176. Pearce II and Lipin, supra note 52.
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and enhance their chances of recovery.177 The possibility of such a moral haz-
ard has been mitigated to an extent by a recent decision of the Delaware Chan-
cery Court in Quadrant Structured Products Co. Ltd. v. Vertin.178 Vertin held 
that under a derivative action initiated by a creditor, the creditor does not lose 
standing to proceed with the action in the eventuality that the corporation be-
comes solvent during the pendency of the lawsuit.
3. “Much Ado About Little?”(Scope of the Business Judgment Rule)
Stephen Bainbridge argues that the significance of the availability of fiduci-
ary duties in favor of any of the company’s constituencies is largely negated by 
the applicability of the business judgment rule which would preclude judicial 
review of the impugned action irrespective of whether it is the shareholders or 
the creditors that approach the court.179 He thus contends that the issue regard-
ing the applicability of fiduciary duties is really “much ado about little”.180
Others have been highly skeptical of the efficacy of the business judgment 
rule for several reasons. First, the rule does not serve as a disincentive to credi-
tors from bringing suits when they are not technically owed duties. As a result, 
directors may implicitly continue to account for creditors’ interests in the face 
of the threat of protracted litigation and the costs that accompany it.181 The fact 
that creditors have not been dissuaded by the rule and have continued to bring 
claims against directors is supported by empirical data.182 Second (and unrelat-
ed to the issue of fiduciary duties), directors cannot resort to the rule for transac-
tions that are deemed to be a “fraudulent conveyance,” as all the bankruptcy 
trustee is required to demonstrate is that the corporation was insolvent at the 
time of the transfer and that what the transferee received exceeded what it 
would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation; intent is not a mitigating factor 
in such situations.183
177. See Donald J. Detweiler & Sandra G.M. Selzer, Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties of 
Creditors: New Delaware Decision Sets Bright-Line Limit, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2007). See 
also Lane, supra note 172, at 485 and Dionne, supra note 160.
178. No. 6990-VCL, 2015 BL 128889 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015).
179. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 338.
180. Id. at 368.
181. See Dionne, supra note 160; 122261 Fondren, LLC v. Riverbank Realty GP, LLC, No.
H-09-4074, 2010 WL 1741071, 2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2010).
182. See Mark N. Berman, Not so Fast! Delaware Court Reigns in Creditor Suits Against DS 
& OS, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (2005), available at https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/not-so-fast-
delaware-court-reigns-in-creditor-suits-against-ds-os.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2003).
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III. UNITED KINGDOM
A. Duties in Financial Stability
As in the U.S., the U.K. maintains that directors owe fiduciary duties to the 
company for the benefit of its shareholders during financial stability. This is in 
consonance with U.K.’s “economic and proprietary approach”184 to company 
law, as also adopted in the U.S., Australia, and Canada, amongst other coun-
tries.185 In the U.K., the shareholder primacy model for solvent enterprises was 
accorded judicial backing from the 1930s186 and attained statutory sanctity by 
way of the Companies Act, in 2006.187
Prior to this, under common law directors only owed fiduciary duties to the 
company.188 189 In Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd.,190 Lord Greene MR declared 
that directors are to act in a manner which is bona fide in what they consider to 
be the best interests of the company, and not what the court may consider to be 
so.191 This was later interpreted in a manner that resulted in the interests of the 
company being interchangeable with the interests of the members themselves 
(reflecting the change in stance).  There were also cases prior to Re Smith & 
Fawcett Ltd.192 that expressly advocated for shareholder primacy, including the 
famous decision in Dodge v. Ford.193 Thus, the balancing exercise to be con-
ducted by directors was simply between the short term interests of current 
members as against the long term interests of future members.194 This position 
was clarified and reaffirmed in Greenhalgh, in which the court held that direc-
tors are to act in a manner that promoted the interests of members as a general 
body, and need not focus on the company as a separate legal entity.195 Thus, in 
the advancement of shareholders’ interests, directors are expected to focus on 
184. Richard Williams, Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law, 35 U.N.S.W.
L.J. 360, 363 (2012).
185. Id.
186. See Re Lee Behrens & Co. Ltd., [1932] 2 Ch 46, 49.
187. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1 (Eng.)).
188. See John Quinn, The Corporate Objective: Reinterpreting Directors’ Duties (2016) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Dublin City University).
189. See Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 at 424 (Eng.).
190. Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd., [1942] Ch. 304, 306 (H.C.).
191. Id. at 306; see also Percival, [1902] 2 Ch. 421 at 424.
192. Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd., [1942] Ch. 304 at 306.
193. See also Hutton v. West Cork Railway, [1883] 23 Ch. D 654 [Hutton].
194. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES: THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW 16–23 (8th ed. Sweet and Maxwell, 2008); BRENDA M HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW (2d edn.
Oxford University Press, 2009); Lord Wedderburn, The Legal Development of Corporate Responsi-
bility, in K. HOPT AND G. EUBNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ LIABILITIES 5 
(Berlin, 1985).
195. Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd., [1951] Ch. 286 [Greenhalgh]; see also Park v.
Daily News, Ltd., [1962] Ch. 927 [Park].
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shareholder value.196 At the same time, the common law on this point did not 
attain the requisite clarity and seemed to expound the duty in terms of what it 
was not rather than what it was.197 This resulted in the need for greater clarity 
on the issue, thereby necessitating a statutory incorporation of the duty.
Prior to the concept of shareholder primacy being crystallized under the 
Companies Act, the Company Law Review Steering Group (“CLRSG”) had 
emphasized its importance for the U.K.. The CLRSG reaffirmed the sharehold-
er primacy approach, albeit with certain “concessions” in favor of other constit-
uencies.198 Thus came about the “enlightened shareholder value” (“ESV”) con-
cept which took its shape in the form of Section 172(1) of the Companies Act.
As part of its endeavor, the CLRSG undertook a broad spectrum review of 
the developments in U.K. company law right until the early 2000s. During the 
deliberation process on the scope of fiduciary duties owed by directors in sol-
vency, there was polarization between two schools of thought – i.e., the pluralist 
approach versus the ESV approach.199 The pluralist approach advocated that 
directors be required to serve a range of interests that were wider than, and not 
subordinate to shareholder interests.200 On the other hand, the ESV approach 
favored the retention of shareholder primacy, albeit with slight modifications 
that recognized certain other interests (but only to the extent that these furthered 
shareholder interests).201 The other constituencies and interests recognized un-
der ESV included employees, customers, suppliers, the company’s overall repu-
tation, and its impact on the community and environment.202
The debate concluded with the rejection of the pluralist approach and the 
adoption of the ESV approach.203 The principle was thereafter incorporated in 
the Company Law Reform Bill that was introduced in Parliament in November 
2005, and finally incorporated in the Companies Act (which came into effect on 
November 8, 2006). Therefore, U.K. law eschewed a purist shareholder-centric 
approach in favor of one that was relatively more inclusive and progressive.204
196. Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd., [1942] Ch. 304 at 306. It should be noted, however, that cer-
tain cases seem to take a divergent view, see generally Lonhro v. Shell Petroleum, [1980] 1 WLR 
627 (Eng.).
197. Williams, supra note 184, at 363.
198. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, 2000, DTI 10, ¶ 2.11 (UK); see also
COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE 
ECONOMY: THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 1999, DTI, ¶ 37 (UK).
199. Id. at ¶ 5.1.10.
200. Id. at ¶ 37.
201. See Mihir Naniwadekar & Umakanth Varottil, The Stakeholder Approach Towards Di-
rectors’ Duties Under Indian Company Law: A Comparative Analysis 2(NUS Law, Working Paper 
No. 2016/006, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822109.); Keay, supra 
note 30.
202. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP (2000), supra note 198 at ¶ 13, 41.
203. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP (2000), supra note 198 at ¶ 2.11.
204. John Armour, et al., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Govern-
ance, 41 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 531 (2003); see also Keay, supra note 30.
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At the same time, Section 170(1) of the Companies Act states that “the general 
duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company to 
the company.”205 The Companies Act thus provides that any duties owed by 
directors to the company’s stakeholders are subordinate to the interests of the 
company itself, and also clarifies that any actions initiated by stakeholders can 
only be derivative in nature, with a demonstrated harm to the company needed 
to be proved.206
Section 172(1) of the Companies Act reads as follows:
“Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its mem-
bers as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, cus-
tomers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environ-
ment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.”
Prima facie, the ESV approach seems rather pluralist in character by ac-
counting for various non-shareholder constituencies.207 Even the CLSRG at-
tempted to propagate this image, characterizing ESV as maximizing “overall 
competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all.”208 However, this is an incor-
rect reading of Section 172(1) which provides for non-member stakeholders to 
be taken into consideration only in furtherance of the interests of the company’s 
members themselves.209 Therefore, material interests of other constituencies 
are not permitted to be taken into account (in the process of “having regard to”
such interests) without the ultimate benefit of the decision accruing to the 
shareholders.210
205. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, 170(1) (Eng.).
206. Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for Purpose?
13 (University of Leeds, Centre for Business Law and Practice, Working Paper, August 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662411.
207. See Roman Tomasic, Company Law Modernisation and Corporate Governance in the 
UK – Some Recent Issues and Debates, VICTORIA L. SCH. J. 43 (2011); Luca Cerioni, The Success 
of the Company in Section 172(1) of UK Company Act 2006: Towards and ‘Enlightened Directors’
Primacy?, 4 ORIGINAL L. REV. 37 (2008).
208. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, 2000, Chapter 2 ¶ 2.21 (UK).
209. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201; Keay, supra note 30.
210. See also Keay, supra note 30; House of Commons, Standing Committee D, Fifteenth 
Sitting, 11 July 2006, Cols. 591–93, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmstand/
cmscclaw.htm.
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In any case, by virtue of directors’ duties being owed to the company (as 
specified under Section 170(1)), other constituencies are precluded from enforc-
ing their rights under Section 172(1). Thus, only the shareholders are afforded 
the right to bring derivative claims against a company (under Section 260(1) of 
the Companies Act).211 It can thus hardly be said that the ESV approach is one 
that is pluralistic or that promotes the theory of “dual consideration.”212
As described above, Section 172(1) provides an illustrative list of consid-
erations that directors are to “have regard to” while discharging their duties for 
the benefit of the “members as a whole.”213 In fact, this is why the approach is 
considered “enlightened.”214 The considerations set out under Section 172(1) 
are not meant to be an exhaustive list but simply to provide directors with “a list 
of exhortations to ‘good’ conduct.”215 The duties to “have regard to” include 
inter alia taking into consideration the likely consequences of any long term de-
cisions, the interests of the company’s employees, fostering the company’s
business relationship and reputation, and the impact of its operations on the 
community and environment.216 Thus, it is theoretically possible that courts 
may approve of directors acting in furtherance of the interests of the company’s 
members, by focusing on employee welfare rather than solely on profit mak-
ing.217 Similarly, since duties are owed for the benefit of “members as a 
whole”, it may be justifiable for directors to take decisions that promote the 
success of the company to the detriment of certain select shareholders.218 This 
however is unlikely, as courts have been seen to take a rather conservative ap-
proach and have not been willing to dilute shareholder primacy even to the 
slightest extent.219
Although creditors find no specific mention in Section 172(1) (other than in 
the form of “suppliers”220), it is arguable that creditors would fall under sub-
section (3) of Section 172(1), i.e., “others,” by way of operation of the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis.221 This however is rather unlikely because creditors’ inter-
ests are specifically provided for under Section 172(3) of the Companies Act.
211. Parker Hood, Directors Duties under the Companies Act 2006: Clarity or Confusion? 13 
J. CORP. L. STUD. 47 (2013); Williams, supra note 184.
212. Collins C. Ajibo, A Critique of Enlightened Shareholder Value: Revisiting the Share-
holder Primacy Theory, 2(1) BIRKBECK L. REV. 37, 37–58 (2014).
213. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (Eng.).
214. See also Keay, supra note 30.
215. Williams, supra note 184, at 397–408.
216. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (Eng.).
217. See John Lowry, The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountabil-
ity Gap through Efficient Disclosure, 68(3) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 607 (2009) (Eng.).
218. See Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Rank Organisation Ltd., [1985] BCLC 
11; Re Pantone 485 Ltd., [2002] 1 BCLC 266 [Pantone].
219. See Marios Koutsias, Shareholder Supremacy in a Nexus of Contracts: A Nexus of Prob-
lems, 38(4) BUS. L. REV. 136–46 (2017).
220. Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 172(1)(c) (Eng.).
221. Ajibo, supra note 212, at 55.
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The only rights that the Companies Act expressly provides to creditors of sol-
vent companies is the right of disclosure. This is by way of a “business review”
that is mandated under Section 417(2) of the Companies Act (now referred to as 
a strategic report).222 As part of this business review, directors are expected to 
give a comprehensive and objective analysis of the company’s performance by 
adoption of key performance indicators.
Section 172(1) specifies that directors are to act in a good faith manner that 
“promote[s] the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole.”223 The exact scope and meaning of this phrase, however, is not clear 
from a plain reading of the provision. Section 170(1) should be read with Sec-
tion 170(4) of the Companies Act, which provides that “general duties shall be 
interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules or equitable prin-
ciples, and regard shall be had to the corresponding common law rules and eq-
uitable principles in interpreting and applying the general duties.”224 A joint 
reading of the two provisions would clarify that the duty being referred to under 
Section 172(1) is nothing but the common law duty to promote the interests of 
the company for the benefit of its current and future shareholders.225
Moreover, it is possible that the provision also provides for a “business 
judgement” type immunity that requires only that courts be satisfied that direc-
tors acted in “good faith” in promoting the success of the company for the 
members as a whole.226 In this regard, directors may take into account the con-
siderations listed under Section 172(1)(a)–(f) in any permutation or combination 
as they please, as long as the interests of the shareholders are promoted.227 The 
Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill also provide that a deci-
sion as to what constitutes (and what does not) the promotion of the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, is one that is left to the 
discretion of directors, in good faith.228
However, it is unlikely that courts will treat Section 172(1) as constituting a 
comprehensive business judgment rule since it finds its basis in common law.
The CLRSG states that:
222. Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, c.46, 
§ 417(2).
223. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (Eng.).
224. Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 172(4) (Eng.).
225. Ajibo, supra note 212, at 55.
226. Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and As-
sessment, 28(4), COMPANY LAWYER 5 (2007).
227. Note 309 of the Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill (dated May 24, 
2006), available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/190/en/06190x-e.htm#
index_link_29.
228. Guidance on Key Clauses to the Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing 
the Framework (Department of Trade and Industry 2000) at ¶ 63; see also Davy KC Wu, Manageri-
al Behaviour, Company Law and the Problem of Enlightened Shareholder Value, COMPANY 
LAWYER 2 (2010).
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[C]ourts have shown a proper reluctance to enter into the merits of commercial de-
cisions; there are major difficulties in drafting such a provision which would add 
complexity and is likely to be inflexible and unfair, being too harsh in some cases 
and allowing too much leeway in others. The principle as drafted leaves room for 
the courts to develop this approach. We also propose to retain in slightly more 
generous form the existing provision enabling the courts to relieve directors of lia-
bility. We therefore oppose a legislative business judgment rule.229
Further, notwithstanding the flexibility afforded to directors within the four 
corners of Section 172(1), the provision still constitutes a shift away from the 
earlier position laid out in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd.230
That said, creditors’ interests are not completely ignored while a company is 
financially solvent. Creditors are indirectly afforded certain protections under 
the Disqualification Act. The Disqualification Act provides that the State may 
apply for the disqualification of a director, if such director acts in a manner that 
makes him “unfit to be concerned in the management of the company.”231 The 
legislation came into effect pursuant to the report of the Cork Committee on In-
solvency Law Reform,232 which aimed to institute an effective regime for tack-
ling rampant “abuses of limited liability.”233
The standard for determining “unfitness” under the statute has been left am-
biguous, and the court is guided instead by an illustrative list of conduct set out 
in Schedule 1 of the Disqualification Act. Importantly, the welfare of creditors 
is featured amongst the several other matters that find mention under Schedule 
1 (including the protection of shareholders and other constituencies).234 Thus, 
while not providing a direct remedy to creditors, the legislation penalizes direc-
tors for their actions that violate creditors’ rights.235 Although this remedy 
seems rather promising for creditors and other non-shareholder constituencies, 
there is a catch, i.e. that applications for disqualification (under Section 8) may 
only be made by the State and not by the parties themselves. Furthermore, it is 
uncertain whether the introduction of the ESV principle under the new Compa-
nies Act will alter or take away the benefit afforded under the Disqualification 
Act. This has not been the case thus far, and there has been no visible impact of 
the introduction of the principle on previously decided cases under the Disquali-
229. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, GUIDANCE ON KEY CLAUSES TO THE 
COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, Department of 
Trade and Industry 2000,  ¶ 3.69 (UK).
230. See Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd., [1942] Ch. 304 (that directors are completely free to adopt 
any methodology whatsoever in the promotion of the interests of the company).
231. Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c.8(2).
232. See INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE: REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, 1982, 
Cmnd 8558, (UK).
233. Id. at ¶ 1808, 1813.
234. See, e.g., Company Directors Disqualification Act Schedule 1, ¶ 7, (1986).
235. Donna W. Mckenzie-Skene, Directors Duties to Creditors of a Financially Distressed 
Company, A Perspective from Across the Pond, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 499, 526 (2007).
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fication Act, or on the considerations adopted by the State (or the official re-
ceiver under Section 6) in resorting to such proceedings.236
It is also interesting to note that the provision on “transactions defrauding 
creditors”237 under the Insolvency Act, 1986 (“Insolvency Act”) applies even in 
solvency (there being no look-back period provided in this respect). To demon-
strate a violation under this section, however, it is necessary to prove that the 
impugned transaction was entered into at undervalue, and that it was entered 
into for the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of a creditor.238 The task 
of proving such a violation, therefore, is particularly onerous.239
B. Duties in Insolvency
Much like the U.S., creditors are deemed to be the company’s primary risk 
bearers upon the commencement of actual insolvency in the U.K..240 Thus, the 
focus of directors’ fiduciary duties is towards creditors in insolvency.241 The 
move away from a shareholder-focused approach is facilitated by Section 
172(3), which operates as an exception to the rule under Section 172(1) (and is 
also applicable in the zone of insolvency, as discussed hereinafter). This provi-
sion makes the ESV rule “subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring di-
rectors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors 
of the company.”242 By virtue of this provision, creditors’ interests are said to 
override those of shareholders despite shareholders rights being generally pri-
oritized under Section 172(1). This principle also finds mention in the Explana-
tory Notes to the Companies Act.243 As a result, a deemed suspension of the 
operation of Section 172(1) is triggered in insolvency (as also in the zone).244
236. See THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2010-11, HC, 31–32 
(UK,), http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1012/hc13/1388/1388.pdf; Williams, 
supra note 184, at 362–63.
237. Insolvency Act 1986, § 424 (UK).
238. Insolvency Act 1986, § 423 (UK) (the likelihood of the transaction having been entered 
into for this purpose could be either actual or potential.).
239. See Andrew Keay, The Duty of Directors to Take Account of Creditors’ Interests: Has it 
Any Role to Play?, J. BUS. L. 379 (2002).
240. Armour, supra note 204, at 555; Oliver Hart and John Moore, Default and Renegotia-
tion: A Dynamic Model of Debt, 113 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 1 (1998).
241. Andrew Keay, Another Way of Skinning the Cat : Enforcing Directors’ Duties to Credi-
tors, 17 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1, 5–7 (2004); Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v.
Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) at 33 (Eng.); In Re Pantone 485 Ltd., [2002] 1 BCLC 266 (Ch) at 
¶ 69 (Eng.); Gwyer Assoc. Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd., [2003] BCC 855 (Ch) at 909 
(Eng.); In Re Frenderick Inns Ltd., [1994] 1 ILRM 387, ¶ 47; Company Law Reform Bill 2005, HL 
Bill [34] cl. 156(4) (Eng.).
242. Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 172(3) (UK) (emphasis added).
243. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, Explanatory Notes ¶ 331 (Eng.).
244. Keay, supra note 239.
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In addition, shareholders are no longer permitted to ratify actions taken by di-
rectors.245
Section 172(3) is deliberately worded in an open-ended manner and pro-
vides no specifics regarding the scope or the trigger for duties shifting towards 
creditors.  The provision instead defers to existing common law and provides 
scope for its further development. The provision also implicitly operates to 
save the pre-existing statutory rights of creditors, such as those pertaining to 
wrongful trading or preferential transactions.246 The principle that directors 
owe fiduciary duties to creditors in insolvency constitutes a “rule of law” for 
purposes of Section 172(3) as it has been applied and reaffirmed by English 
courts.247 The common law on this point finds its origins in the dictum of Jus-
tice Mason’s opinion in the Australian High Court decision of Walker v. Wim-
borne.248 Walker held that “in discharging their duty to the company, directors 
are required to take into account the interests of its shareholders and its credi-
tors.  Any failure by the directors to take the creditors’ interests into account 
will have adverse consequences for the company and for the creditors them-
selves.”249 This approach was reaffirmed in subsequent common law decisions 
including the famous decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
Kinsela which influenced the decision to incorporate the approach under U.K. 
law.250 251
In the U.K., recognition of the principle was first accorded in the case of 
Lornho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd.252 in 1980, and subsequently in Re 
Horsley & Weight Ltd.253 However, in a later decision (Multinational Gas254), 
Lord Justice Dillon did not recognize the existence of the duty, and stated that 
fiduciary duties are owed only to the company and not its creditors, whether 
current or future.255 Fortunately, this decision was subsequently distinguished 
245. Keay, supra note 241; Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 
BCC 30 (EWCA) (Eng.); Miller v. Bain, [2002] 1 BCLC 266; DD Prentice, Creditors Interests and 
Directors Duties, 10 OJLS 275 (1990).
246. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK (2000).
247. See Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) at 
33 (Eng.); In Re Pantone 485 Ltd., [2002] 1 BCLC 266 (Ch) at ¶ 69 (Eng.); Gwyer v. London 
Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd., [2002] EWHC 2748 [Gwyer Associates]; Re MDA Investment Manage-
ment Ltd., [2003] EWHC 227 (Ch.): Re Cityspan Ltd., [2007] EWHC 751; Re Fredericks Inn Ltd.,
[1994] ILRM 387.
248. Walker v. Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1 (Austl.).
249. Id. at ¶ 13.
250. See Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd., [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA) [hereinafter 
Permakraft]; see also Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd., (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (Austl.).
251. Kinsela, 4 N.S.W.L.R. at 722.
252. [1980] 1 WLR 627 (UKHL) (UK)].
253. In re Horsley & Weight Ltd. [1982] Ch. 442 (Eng.).
254. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services 
Ltd., [1983] Ch. 258.
255. Id. at 585.
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in West Mercia Safetywear256 on the basis that the company in question in Mul-
tinational Gas257 was “amply solvent,” and it was clarified that the rule in Kin-
sela258 applies in insolvency scenarios.259 Interestingly, in West Mercia, Lord 
Justice Dillon found that the director breached his fiduciary duty because he 
“ought to have known” that the company was insolvent at the time of his giving 
a preferential payment to a related company.260
The issue of whether duties to creditors are owed by directors directly or in-
directly has also seen considerable debate in the U.K. under common law (prior 
to the commencement of the Companies Act). In Walker, the duty was ex-
pressed to be one that is owed to the company and not directly to its creditors.
In Winkworth v. Edward Bardon Development,261 however, Lord Templeman 
stated that the “duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors 
of the company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly adminis-
tered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the di-
rectors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors,”262 thus implying a direct 
duty owed to the company’s creditors (this interpretation was deemed incorrect 
by the High Court of Australia in Spies v. Queen263, however).264 The Wink-
worth approach was conclusively reversed in Yukong Lines of Korea v. Rends-
berg Investment Corp of Liberia,265 wherein Justice Toulson held that a director 
“does not owe a direct fiduciary duty. . .[to] an individual creditor, nor is an in-
dividual creditor entitled to sue for breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the di-
rector to the company.”266
The debate ended in favor of the Yukong approach by virtue of the incorpo-
ration of Section 170(1) of the Companies Act, which states that “[t]he general 
duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of the company to 
the company.”267 A company-centric approach would prevent the multiplicity 
of claims by individual creditors, as creditors would only be permitted to initiate 
256. Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) at 33 
(Eng.).
257. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services 
Ltd., [1983] Ch 258.
258. Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd., (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (Austl.).
259. Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) at 253 
(Eng.).
260. Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) (Eng.).
261. See Winkworth v. Baron Dev. Co. Ltd.,[1986] 1 W.L.R. 1512 (HL) [hereinafter Wink-
worth].
262. Id; see also Lornho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd, [1980] 1 WLR 627 (UKHL) (UK)].
263. (2000) 201 CLR 603 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne, J.J.).
264. VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 500
(2d ed. Cambridge University Press, 2002).
265. [1988] BCC 870 (QBD) (Comm) (Eng.).
266. Id. at 884.
267. Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 170(1) (emphasis added); see also GHLM Trading Ltd. v.
Maroo, [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch), 168 [UK].
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derivative claims by demonstrating a harm to the company instead.268 This 
would also negate the possibility of double recovery by creditors, and would 
ensure the sanctity of the pari passu principle and the liquidation waterfall 
mechanism.269
Another important debate that has taken place in the U.K. is whether direc-
tors, while owing their duties to creditors in insolvency, are permitted to take 
into account the interests of other constituencies as well. The Court of Appeal 
in Brady v. Brady270 seemed to answer this question in the negative, Justice 
Nourse, stating that “where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully sol-
vent, the interests of the company are in reality the interests of existing credi-
tors.” A similar opinion was given by Justice Street, in Kinsela271 (a decision 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales), which was approved without any 
further elucidation by Lord Dillon in West Mercia Safetywear v. Dodd272 West 
Mercia, however, was subsequently cited for the proposition that shareholders’
interests are to be taken into account by directors in addition to those of credi-
tors in insolvency.273 In Re Pantone, however, a position similar to the one in 
Brady was reinstated once again (i.e., a focus on creditors in insolvency to the 
exclusion of shareholders).274 Re Pantone relied on the decision in Re Horsley 
v. Weight Ltd to uphold the validity of the principle.275 As some have pointed 
out, the decision in Horsley does not in fact support such a proposition. As a 
result, Brady is effectively the only judicial decision that seems to be on solid 
grounding in terms of precedential value, and the debate on this issue seems to 
not yet have reached a conclusive outcome.276
The legal framework in the U.K. also provides for certain alternative mech-
anisms for third parties (including creditors) to assert rights against directors of 
insolvent corporations. One such mechanism is provided under Section 212 of 
the Insolvency Act, which proscribes “misfeasance” by officers (including di-
rectors) of a company and the breach of any fiduciary duties owed by such of-
ficers to its creditors.277 An application under Section 212 can be made by the 
liquidator or any creditor of the insolvent company. If the charge under Section 
268. See C.A. Riley, Directors’ Duties and the Interests of Creditors, 10 COMPANY L. 87 
(1989).
269. D D.D. Prentice, Directors, Creditors and Shareholders, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF 
TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 276 (Ewan McKendrick ed.,Oxford Press 1992).
270. Brady v. Brady (1987) 3 B.C.C. 535, 552 (UK) [hereinafter Brady].
271. Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd., (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (Austl.).
272. Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) at 241
(Eng.).
273. See Gwyer v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd., [2002] EWHC 2748; Clydebank Foot-
ball Club Ltd. v. Steedman, (2000) CSOH 250 (Scot.).
274. In Re Pantone 485 Ltd., [2002] 1 BCLC 266 (Ch) (Eng.)9.
275. In re Horsley & Weight Ltd. [1982] Ch. 442 (Eng.) at 1055–56.
276. See CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS 173 (David Feld-
man & Frank Meisel eds., 1996).
277. Insolvency Act 1986, § 212 (Eng.).
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212 is proved, the court may order the officer or director to repay such money, 
or contribute such amounts to the assets of the company as it deems fit in rela-
tion to the breach or misfeasance.278 This mechanism may even be available to 
creditors while the company is still solvent or in the zone of insolvency, the 
scope of the provision not being restricted to acts carried out by officers only 
post-insolvency (it only providing that such breaches are to be discovered “dur-
ing the course of winding up of a company”). There has been general appre-
hension among creditors in adopting this route, however, owing to the fact that 
all contributions and recovery under this provision accrues to the company it-
self, and not directly to them.
Another mechanism favoring creditors in order to ensure the compliance of 
fiduciary duties in insolvency is the “disqualification route,” i.e., under the Dis-
qualification Act. Similar to Section 8 of the Act, which affords an opportunity 
to the State to apply for disqualification of directors due to “unfit” management 
of a solvent company, Section 6 of the Disqualification Act provides for dis-
qualification in insolvency. The criteria for the determination of “unfitness”
under Section 6 is separately provided for under Schedule 2 of the Disqualifica-
tion Act, which expressly covers creditors’ interests.279 In Re Sevenoaks Sta-
tioners (Retail) Ltd.,280 it was stated that “[i]t is beyond dispute that the purpose 
of section 6 is to protect the public, and in particular potential creditors of com-
panies from losing money through companies becoming insolvent when the di-
rectors of those companies are people unfit to be concerned in the management 
of a company.”281 Further, it was held that directors can be liable for disqualifi-
cation in situations where they permit or cause a company to trade, and where 
they have knowledge that no reasonable prospect exists for the company’s cred-
itors to be paid.282 Therefore, the remedy under this route is available even 
where the remedy for wrongful trading is not (as described in the next section).
However, as is the case with Section 8, the locus to bring applications under 
Section 6 of the Act is not afforded to creditors. It is instead the official receiv-
er of the company who can bring such actions. Despite this shortcoming, the 
Disqualification Act can been seen to have been effectively used to protect 
creditors’ interests in several instances.283
278. Insolvency Act 1986, § 212 (Eng.).
279. Disqualification Act, Schedule 2 (Eng.).
280. [Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd.,[1991] 3 Eng. Rep. 578, 583 (UK) [hereinafter 
Sevenoaks].
281. Id. at 176.
282. Id. at 283; Re Bath Glass Ltd., (1988) 4 B.C.L.C. 130 (Ch.) (Eng.); Brady v. Brady 
(1987) 3 B.C.C. 535 (UK); Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 
(EWCA) (Eng.); Facia Footwear Ltd. (in administration) v. Hinchliffe, [1988] 1 B.C.L.C. 218; In 
Re Pantone 485 Ltd., [2002] 1 BCLC 266 (Ch) (Eng.); Gwyer v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd.,
[2002] EWHC 2748; Re MDA Investment Management Ltd., [2003] EWHC 227 (Ch.).
283. Williams, supra note 184.
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C. Duties in the Vicinity/ Zone of Insolvency
U.K. law recognizes that fiduciary duties may be owed to creditors prior to 
the commencement of insolvency itself.284 This is due to the fact that U.K. law 
identifies creditors as the primary risk bearers of a company in financial dis-
tress, a position some say was first brought about in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publica-
tions Co.285286 That U.K. courts have granted such recognition to duties in the 
zone is significant, as all other statutory rights belonging to creditors (with cer-
tain minor exceptions) are triggered only in liquidation. The genesis for this 
approach lies in the principle embodied under Section 172(3) of the Companies 
Act (applying the rule of interpretation provided in Section 170(4) of the Com-
panies Act).287 Further, the Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act also ex-
pressly state that such a shift is to “occur as the company approaches insolven-
cy.”288 Recognition to this principle was also accorded in the CLRSG’s final 
report (although it was initially rejected in its trial draft).289290
U.K. courts have established multiple tests to determine the point at which 
fiduciary duties shift to creditors pre-insolvency. These have included tests 
based on when the company is inter alia “nearing insolvency,”291 on the “bor-
derline of insolvency,”292 on the “verge of insolvency,”293 and in “doubtful in-
solvency.”294 Certain tests do not even make a specific reference to the compa-
ny’s impending insolvency, simply requiring that the company be in a 
“dangerous financial position.” instead.295 Even the decision in Brady v.
284. See, e.g., GHLM Trading Ltd. v. Maroo, [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch), 168 [UK]; see also 
Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] 4 BCC 30 (EWCA) at 552 (Eng.);
DEREK FRENCH, STEPHEN MAYSON AND CHRISTOPHER RYAN, COMPANY LAW 485 (26th ed., Ox-
ford Press 2010).
285. 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
286. See Stephen McDonnell, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co: Insolvency Shifts Direc-
tors’ Burden from Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 185 (1994); Mark Van der 
Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996).
287. ANNOTATED COMPANIES LEGISLATION ¶ 10.172.06 (John Birds et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012); 
ANDREW HICKS AND SAY H. GOO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMPANY LAW 385 (6th ed., Oxford 
Press, 2008).
288. Companies Act 2006, c. 2, § 172, Explanatory Notes ¶ 332 (UK).
289. Id. at ¶ 3.12, 3.13 (UK).
290. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, 2000, Ch. 3 ¶ 3.72, 3.73 (UK).
291. The Liquidator of Wendy Fair (Heritage) Ltd. v. Hobday [2006] EWHC (Ch) 5803 ¶ 66, 
All ER 238 (Eng.).
292. Eastford Ltd. v. Gillespie, Airdrie North Ltd., [2010] CSOH 132, at ¶ 22 (Scot.).
293. Gwyer v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd., [2002] EWHC 2748.
294. Id.; see also Brady v. Brady (1987) 3 B.C.C. 535, 553 (UK); In re Horsley & Weight 
Ltd. [1982] Ch. 442 (Eng.).
295. Facia Footwear Ltd. (in administration) v. Hinchliffe, [1988] 1 B.C.L.C. 218, 228; see 
also Williams v. Farrow, [2008] EWHC (Ch) 3663 (Eng.); Linton v. Telnet Pty Ltd., [1999] 
NSWCA 33; Re MDA Investment Management Ltd., [2003] EWHC 227 (Ch.).
Spring 2019] In Whose Interests Should a Company Be Run? 327
Brady296 lays down a similar test, the company in that case having remained 
solvent even after the completion of the impugned transaction, and the court 
held that directors are to consider interests of creditors even in situations where 
a transaction could potentially affect the company’s solvency.297
As mentioned in the previous section, fiduciary duties also arise in favor of 
creditors in the zone of insolvency under Section 212 of the Insolvency Act.
Such duties also exist in the form of the ex post liability imposed by Section 214 
of the Insolvency Act (dealing with wrongful trading).298 The Section 214 duty 
also retains its applicability post the commencement of the Companies Act by 
way of the operation of the principles contained in Section 172(3), amounting to 
a specific “enactment” or “rule of law” requiring directors to consider the inter-
ests of the company’s creditors.299 Section 214 provides for personal liability 
for directors who knew or ought to have concluded prior to the commencement 
of winding up, that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding 
insolvent liquidation;300 and where such directors, despite having such 
knowledge, failed to take the requisite steps towards minimizing loss to the 
company’s creditors.301 Section 214 thus covers decisions taken by directors in 
disregard of creditors’ interests subsequent to the company having reached the 
“brink of insolvency.”302 The provision provides for an objective test that does 
not proscribe ordinary and legitimate trading in the lead-up to the company’s 
insolvency.303 This can also be seen from the decision in Continental Assur-
ance Plc.,304 where the court refused to impose liability on the directors simply 
because they had permitted the company to continue trading in the zone of in-
solvency. Instead, the court held that a simplistic ‘but for’ test could not be ap-
plied in the context of Section 214; rather, there must be a nexus between the 
directors’ actions and the loss sustained by the company.305
If the tests of Section 214 are met, the liquidator is empowered to make an 
application to the court seeking a direction that the company’s directors be 
compelled to make such contributions to the assets of the company as the court 
may think proper, in order to compensate for the loss.306 It is interesting to note 
296. Brady v. Brady (1987) 3 B.C.C. 535 (UK).
297. See also Katz v. McNally, [1996] BCC 933.
298. Insolvency Act 1986, 45 § 214 (UK).
299. Ajibo, supra note 212, at 43.
300. Insolvency Act 1986, 45 § 214(2) (UK).
301. Insolvency Act 1986, 45 § 214(3) (UK).
302. See Sean Gabb, Directors’ Duties at Common Law to Consider the Interests of Creditors 
(2017), https://www.seangabb.co.uk/directors-duties-common-law-consider-interests-creditors-
2017-sean-gabb/.
303. See also Keay, supra note 30.
304. Re Continental Assurance Co. of London Plc., [2007] 2 BCLC 287 [Continental Assur-
ance].
305. Id. at ¶ 289.
306. Insolvency Act 1986, 45 § 214(1) (UK).
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that Section 214(6) provides for a balance sheet test to determine whether the 
insolvent liquidation of the company was inevitable at the time the impugned 
transactions occurred. Section 214 was identified by the European Commis-
sion’s High Level Group of Company Law Experts as constituting an apt model 
for creditor-regarding duties to be imposed pre-insolvency.307 The provision 
contains its own inbuilt ‘business judgment rule’ under sub-section (3), which 
applies when directors have taken every step (that ought to have been taken) to 
minimize the loss accruing to the company’s creditors. Another benefit of 
adopting the wrongful trading route is that courts cannot post facto relieve di-
rectors from liability, as they are capable of doing in respect of an ordinary 
breach of duty under Section 1157 of the Companies Act.308 Further, liquida-
tors are permitted to tag claims under Section 214 with any other claims against 
directors under the provisions dealing with other antecedent transactions, which 
allows for a certain level of flexibility.309
Although there exists an inherent possibility of bias in favor of creditors in 
conducting an ex post determination of the occurrence of a breach of directors’
duties, U.K. courts have made certain efforts to mitigate this. In Colin Gwyer 
Associates Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse),310 Queen’s Counsel Lesmin 
Kosmin  (sitting as deputy judge of the High Court at the time) held that direc-
tors should be guided in the determination of their duties towards creditors by 
the same test that is applicable to shareholders, as laid down in Charter-
bridge.311312 Thus, if it is established that a director, in approving a certain 
transaction, failed to take into account creditors’ interests in insolvency or in the 
zone, the court must determine whether an intelligent and honest director, could 
have reasonably believed such a transaction to have been for the benefit of the 
company, considering the entirety of circumstances at play at the specific period 
of time the transaction occurred.313 This test, although objective in nature, can-
not be said to be foolproof, as it effectively relies on a “reasonable man’s stand-
ard,” and does not do away with the possibility of bias altogether.
The primary difference between the fiduciary duties arising out of Section 
172(3) of the Companies Act and those under Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 
is the point at which these duties are triggered. The former type of duty is trig-
307. High Level Group of Company Law Experts, A Modern Regulatory Framework for 
Company Law in Europe: A Consultative Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Ex-
perts, Brussels, (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/
consult_en.pdf.
308. Companies Act, §1157 (Eng.).
309. Keay, supra note 239.
310. See Generally Gwyer v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd., [2002] EWHC 2748.
311. Charterbridge Corp. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., [1970] Ch. 62
312. The test being whether an “intelligent and honest man” in the position of a director could 
have reasonably believed the action to be for the benefit of the company, taking into account the 
entirety of the circumstances at the point in time.
313. Charterbridge Corp. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., [1970] Ch. 62.
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gered earlier than the duty under Section 214 as per the tests set out above. Du-
ties under Section 172(3) may arise when insolvency is doubtful itself (although 
multiple parallel tests exist in this regard), whereas the duty under Section 214 
arises only when there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquida-
tion.314 Further, recourse to Section 214 is available only after the commence-
ment of liquidation (and can be taken only by the liquidator), whereas recourse 
to a Section 172(3) duty is available as soon as the company enters the zone.315
D. Criticisms and Observations
1.  Financial Stability
The ESV principle has been lauded for its endorsement of a multi-
stakeholder approach that brings about accountability of directors to stakehold-
ers other than shareholders.316 The extent that this protection extends beyond 
shareholders in reality, however, is disputable. At a fundamental level, credi-
tors and other non-shareholder constituencies are not accorded locus to bring 
actions against the company’s directors under the Companies Act (as is specifi-
cally provided to shareholders).317 This effectively renders their rights available 
only in the abstract.318 At the same time, the ambiguity surrounding the rights 
available under Section 172, and the efficacy of the provision itself, would dis-
incentivize even those non self-interested shareholders, who wish to bring ac-
tions on behalf of aggrieved creditors.319
In light of this, it is clear that the U.K. has moved away from a model that 
adopts the dual consideration theory.320 Some have argued that as Section 172 
proscribes actions that affect shareholders’ interests only in a negative manner, 
the law provides scope for directors to look to others’ interests.321 As men-
tioned above, however, it is evident that the law simply does not provide the in-
centive for directors to do so. Further, it is not clear what is meant by directors 
requiring to “have regard to” the principles set out under Section 172(1). While 
the Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act322 state that, in “having regard to”
314. Keay, supra note 239.
315. See Insolvency Act 1986, 45 § 214(3) (UK).
316. Virginia Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. 61 (2010).
317. Section 260, Companies Act, 2006.
318. See L. Sealy, Directors’ Duties—An Unnecessary Gloss, 47(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 175–77 
(1988) (Eng.).
319. Williams, supra note 184.
320. JOHN EDWARD PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE 
THEORY OF COMPANY LAW (1993); See Simon Deakin, The Coming Transformation of Shareholder 
Value, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L. REV. 11, 12 (2005).
321. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 184 at 361–63.
322. Companies Act 2006, Explanatory Notes ¶ 328 (Eng.).
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such factors, it will not be sufficient for directors to just pay lip service to them, 
there is nothing that really prevents directors from doing so.323 As per the view 
of the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the determination of whether direc-
tors have had sufficient regard to the ESV principles itself is a “matter for the 
director’s good faith judgment.”324
The lack of clarity in this respect permits courts to interpret the provision on 
a case-by-case basis, resulting in perpetuation of uncertainty in the minds of di-
rectors regarding the scope of their duties.325 Requiring directors to have regard 
to interests of other stakeholders that are in direct conflict with their primary 
duty towards shareholders, and providing no further clarity in this regard, dis-
torts the overall duty in a manner which “amounts ultimately to no more than a 
vague obligation to be fair.”326 In fact, the Australian Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services had considered and express-
ly rejected the ESV approach after identifying its several flaws, instead favoring  
an “enlightened self-interest” model under which directors can consider the in-
terests of other stakeholders to the extent that they are relevant to the long-term 
growth of the company.327
The requirement of publishing a business review can hardly qualify as a 
consolation for creditors, especially in light of the fact that the CLRSG, in its 
deliberations, was initially considering a full-fledged and comprehensive ‘oper-
ating and financial review’ (“OFR”).328 The introduction of an OFR was initial-
ly used to convince those advocating for a pluralist approach to concede to the 
ESV and was then done away with after the introduction of the ESV princi-
ple.329 The OFR was focused on ensuring maximum information and disclosure 
to all stakeholders, while the business review is mostly shareholder-centric, and 
focuses on maximization of value to the business.330 Unlike the OFR, under the 
business review, disclosures on stakeholder issues are no longer mandatory, and 
are only necessary to the extent that directors “deem them relevant for an under-
standing of the business.”331
323. Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 309 (1988).
324. 11 July 2006, Parl Deb HL (2006) col. 591 (UK).
325. Andrew Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened 
Shareholder Value and More: Much Ado About Little?, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2011).
326. L. S. Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and 
Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 175 (1987).
327. See PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: MANAGING RISK AND 
CREATING VALUE (2006), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/
Corporations_and_Financial_Services/Completed_inquiries/2004-
07/corporate_responsibility/report/index.
328. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP (2000), supra note 290 at ¶ 34.
329. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 188, at 62.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 74.
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2.  Vicinity of Insolvency
While the U.K. recognizes the need to re-orient directors’ duties to focus on 
creditors in the zone, it has not developed any corresponding bright-line test to 
guide directors in their determination at the relevant points in time. Directors 
are left guessing when the shift is triggered from duties owed under Section 
172(1) to those under Section 172(3). As has been elucidated in the previous 
section of this Comment, court decisions seem to have been very inconsistent 
and have adopted a vast array of tests in order to determine the point at which 
the shift is to occur. This produces apprehension in the minds of potential liti-
gants regarding their chances of succeeding in an action brought against the di-
rectors, and thus indirectly accords impunity to directors even where there has 
been a clear breach. A possible solution, as Finch suggests, is that the trigger 
not result in a reorientation that is solely focused on creditors’ interests, but 
should continue to adopt a multi-stakeholder approach (contrary to the holding 
in Brady v. Brady, discussed above), albeit according primacy to creditors’ in-
terests, and thereby according directors more flexibility in their decision mak-
ing.332 However, it is unclear how such an approach would reduce the current 
ambiguity, and may pose the additional risk of diluting even the rights that are 
currently afforded to creditors.
Several of the tests established by the courts would deem the company to be 
in the zone even where the possibility of the relevant action resulting in insol-
vency is remote. The issue was accurately identified in the recent case of BTI 
2014 LLC v. Sequana SA,333 wherein the mere inclusion of a large provision in 
the company’s books with respect to an unknown liability was held inadequate 
to trigger the shift of duties to creditors:
[i]t cannot be right that whenever a company has on its balance sheet a provision in 
respect of a long term liability which might turn out to be larger than the provision 
made, the creditors’ interests duty applies for the whole period during which there 
is a risk that there will be insufficient assets to meet that liability. . .To hold that the 
creditors’ interests duty arises in a situation where the directors make proper provi-
sion for a liability in the company’s accounts but where there is a real risk that the 
provision will turn out to be inadequate would be a significant lowering of the 
threshold.334
Thus, the vicinity of insolvency analysis lacks an objective standard under 
U.K. law despite the fact that such a standard has always existed under Section 
214 of the Insolvency Act and other similar provisions. The confusion with re-
spect to duties owed in the zone is exacerbated due to the fact that the Compa-
nies Act335 permits shareholders to ratify decisions taken by directors that are in 
breach of their duties, in a retrospective manner, which may directly conflict 
332. See FINCH, supra note 264, at 503.
333. BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana & Ors [2016] EWHC 1686 (Ch) (Eng.). See also Dickinson v.
NAL Realisations (Staffordshire) Ltd., [2017] EWHC 28 (Ch) (Eng.).
334. Id.
335. Companies Act 2006, § 239 (U.K.).
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with duties owed to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency, where it is unclear 
when the company actually entered the zone.
In addition to this, and as briefly stated earlier, although there exists a defin-
itive “trigger point” for duties under Section 214 to come into effect, the criti-
cism remains that such duties arise too late.336 The point at which there is “no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquida-
tion” clearly arises much after a company can be said to have entered the zone 
of insolvency.337 Further, the cause of action under Section 214 itself arises on-
ly after the company has gone into insolvent liquidation and therefore provides 
inadequate protection from a creditor standpoint.338 Some have argued that this 
problem is a by-product of the “duty of care” not being recognized as a fiduci-
ary duty under U.K. law.339 Not permitting creditors to make direct claims for 
breaches under Section 214 has been subject to widespread criticism because 
creditors find it difficult to persuade the liquidator to make applications under 
this provision unless there is a clear case of a breach.340 Direct claims, howev-
er, were expressly permitted under the Companies Acts of 1929 and 1948.341
Further, proving lack of good faith in hindsight has proven to be an uphill 
task,342 especially as courts seem to be overly conscious of the hindsight bias 
that exists in favor of creditors, as mentioned above.343
The test under Section 214 also does not provide adequate guidance to di-
rectors on how to avoid liability for wrongful trading, other than simply stating 
that directors are to take “every step with a view to minimizing the potential 
loss to the company’s creditors.”344 Further, the application of the balance sheet 
test to determine the commencement of insolvency is hit by the commercial re-
ality that the value of a company’s assets and liabilities undergo constant and 
inevitable fluctuation.345 Therefore, a breach under this provision may only be 
easy to prove when the directors themselves own a substantial portion of the 
equity.346 Further, there are three possible scenarios in which directors may es-
336. See Thomas Bachner, Wrongful Trading – A New European Model for Creditor Protec-
tion? 5 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 293, 294 (2004).
337. PAUL DAVIES, INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAW, CLARENDON LAW SERIES 90 (2d ed., 
Oxford Unviersity Press – Clarendon Law Series, 2010).
338. Mckenzie-Skene, supra note 235.
339. See Keay, supra note 206, at 16, 33.
340. Id.
341. Companies Act, 1929, § 275(1) (U.K.); and Companies Act 1948, § 332(1) (U.K.).
342. See Sherborne Associates Ltd. (1994), B.C.C. 40 (QB) 55-56 (UK); Welfab Engineers 
Ltd. (1990), B.C.C. 600 (Ch) 603–04 (UK); Continental Assurance Co. (2007), B.C.L.C. 287 (Ch) 
293–94 (UK).
343. See Keay, supra note 30; see also The Liquidator of Marini Ltd v. Dickensen, [2003] 
EWHC 334 (Ch); Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Gash, [1997] BCC 172 at 178.
344. Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214, sch. 3 (Eng.).
345. See Gabb, supra note 302.
346. RIZWAAN JAMEEL MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, THEORY AND APPLICATION
266 (Oxford University Press, 2005).
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cape the applicability of Section 214 altogether.347 These are: (i) when the 
gamble taken by the directors pays off, i.e. the company does not end up in in-
solvent liquidation; (ii) where the company does turn insolvent, but is not actu-
ally put into insolvent liquidation, but is just struck off the register of companies 
at a later point; and (iii) where administration is resorted to instead of insolvent 
liquidation. In these situations, the duty of directors towards creditors remains 
un-triggered.
Another important issue with respect to the implementation of Section 214, 
is the amount of compensation that courts are willing to demand from directors 
who have breached their duties thereunder. In several instances, it has been ob-
served that courts are only willing to demand from directors the value of the 
“diminution in the company’s net asset position” during the look-back period 
provided under Section 214.348 In fact, in some cases, courts have held that no 
compensation is payable because the additional liabilities in question did not 
result in a material increase in the net deficiency of the company.349 Even Ga-
briel Moss has been highly critical of this position and has even gone to the ex-
tent of deeming it a “disgrace” to U.K. jurisprudence.350 As he rightly pointed 
out, such a test would permit directors to circumvent the penalty by repaying 
existing creditors (i.e., those that had lent money prior to the cut-off date) while 
not repaying new creditors who had granted debt after the cut-off date.
Further, courts seem to be less stringent with directors who they believe 
cannot be imputed with full blameworthiness for the acts committed under Sec-
tion 214.351 U.K. law does not also account for several nuances in its wrongful 
trading regime, as are provided for under the framework of other jurisdictions, 
like Germany. German law, under its version of wrongful trading, provides in-
ter alia for special protection and compensation for “new” creditors, i.e., those 
that become creditors after the date on which the duty is deemed to be triggered.
In light of the above, it is not surprising that protections under Section 214 are 
not being utilized to their full potential, and that creditors remain rather disin-
terested in pursuing such actions.352 Further complications were brought about 
by the decision in Oasis Merchandising,353 which established that proceeds em-
anating from a successful Section 214 claim would not be caught by security 
interests, thereby increasing the apprehension in the minds of secured creditors 
to initiate such claims.
347. See Paul Davies, Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions 
Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7(1) EBOR (2006) at 301–37.
348. Id. at 325.
349. See Re Ralls Builders Ltd., Grant v. Ralls, [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch); See also Re Ralls 
Buildings Ltd. (No. 2), Grant v. Ralls, [2016] EWHC 1812 (Ch.).
350. Gabriel Moss, No Compensation for Wrongful Trading – Where Did it All Go Wrong?,
30(4) INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 49 (2017).
351. See Davies, supra note 347.
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353. In re Oasis Merch. Serv. Ltd., [1998] Ch 170 (AC).
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3.  Actual Insolvency
The framework for “actual insolvency” in the U.K. also suffers from a defi-
nitional problem. The primary tests adopted under the insolvency legislation 
are the “balance sheet” test and the “cash flow” test.354 However, there is still 
ambiguity regarding the relevant test to apply in the determination of fiduciary 
duties owed by directors.355 In reality, actual insolvency is largely irrelevant in 
determining whether creditors’ interests should be taken into account; rather, 
these duties commence from the time the company enters the zone itself. How-
ever, the issue of a lack of an objective test still remains a concerning one, espe-
cially in situations where the company jumps directly from solvency to insol-
vency, thereby skipping the zone altogether. Objections have also been raised 
that insolvency can also be “untriggered” on the basis that companies constantly 
fluctuate between solvency and insolvency in their regular functioning.356 U.K.
courts have not provided for the continuity of any actions initiated by creditors 
in insolvency, as was done in the U.S. in the case of Quadrant Structured Prod-
ucts Co. Ltd. v. Vertin.357
Many have suggested an objective test for the determination of actual insol-
vency which applies a standard similar to the one under Section 214 of the In-
solvency Act, and the one applied in Permakraft (i.e. an “ought to have known”
standard). In fact, the CLRSG had also proposed an objective test,358 and a 
draft provision was included in the Statement of Directors’ Duties for purposes 
of further consultation.359 The test recommended by the CLRSG was objective 
354. See Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45 §§ 123, 240(2) (Eng.).
355. Mckenzie-Skene, supra note 235, at 507.
356. Sealy, supra note 326, at 179.
357. See generally Quadrant Structured Products Co. Ltd. v. Vertin, No. 6990-VCL, 2015 BL 
128889 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015).
358. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT, 2001, (U.K.).
359. The draft provision read:
“At a time when a director of a company knows, or would know but for a failure of his to ex-
ercise due care and skill, that it is more likely than not that the company will at some point be 
unable to pay its debts as they fall due –
the duty under paragraph 2 does not apply to him; and (b) he must, in the exercise of his 
powers, take such steps (excluding anything which would breach his duty under paragraph 
1 or 5) as he believes will achieve a reasonable balance between –
reducing the risk that the company will be unable to pay its debts as they fall due; and
promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.
Notes:
What is a reasonable balance between those things at any time must be decided in good faith 
by the director, but he must give more or less weight to the need to reduce the risk according 
as the risk is more or less severe.
(2)  In deciding in any case what would be most likely to promote the success of the com-
pany for the benefit of its members as a whole, the director must take account in good faith 
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to the extent that it was triggered “where it is more likely than not that the com-
pany will at some point be unable to pay its debts as they fall due” but was sub-
jective for purposes of establishing actual compliance with the test.360 The draft 
proposal was not accepted by the Government, except to the extent that it ex-
pressly recognized the need for a statutory provision providing for directors’
duties which came to life by way of Section 172.361 In addition to this, the 
White Paper issued by the Government specifically stated that it had decided 
against including duties to creditors in the statutory statement and had instead 
left the position to continue to develop under common law.362
The ambiguity of the statutory regime under the Companies Act has result-
ed in enormous confusion, which could have easily been prevented with clarity 
at the time of drafting.363 This criticism was shared by the Australian Joint Par-
liamentary Committee on Corporations and Financial Services in its 2006 re-
port:
[t]he Committee does not support the British approach, which appears to introduce 
great uncertainty into the legal expression of directors’ duties. . .Subclause (3) re-
quires directors to have regard to a menu of non-shareholder interests, but gives no 
guidance as to what form this ‘regard’ should take, and therefore gives no guidance 
to directors on what they must do in order to comply.364
The issue is magnified by insubstantial case law under Section 172(3) so far.365
Apart from the above, U.K. law, like that of the U.S., broadly views credi-
tors as a homogenous group and does not consider the varying interests of, and 
the inherent conflict that exists between the different sub-classes of creditors.366
Various authors have stressed the importance of formulations that would accord 
primacy to certain specific types of creditors (other than secured creditors), ow-
ing to the extent of their vulnerability (secured creditors having the protection 
of their security interests, on the other hand). For instance, Finch367 argues that 
the duty should be primarily directed towards unsecured creditors, whereas 
of all the material factors that it is practicable, in the circumstances for him to identi-
fy. . .” [Emphasis supplied]
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365. Keay, supra note 206, at 12.
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CLARKE (ed.) CURRENT ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY LAW 707 (London: Stevens, 1991).
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Lispon368 argues that it should be owed to all creditors that possess a low level 
of volition. A related problem is that a successful claim for a breach of duty 
would bear fruits for all of the company’s creditors without any identity-based 
segregation, anything recoverable under such a claim being considered the 
company’s property.369
IV. INDIA
A. Duties in Financial Stability
1. The Existing Position
The statutory provision that applies to directors’ fiduciary duties in financial 
stability under the Indian framework is Section 166 (2) of the Companies Act, 
2013 (“2013 Act”). The provision reads “[a] director of a company shall act in 
good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company, its employees, the 
shareholders, the community and for the protection of environment.” This pro-
vision should be read with Section 166 (7) of the 2013 Act, which provides that 
in case of contravention of any of the provisions under Section 166 (including 
sub-section (2)), directors are to be punished with a fine of not less than one 
lakh rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees.370
Section 166(2) bears a slight resemblance to Section 172(1) of the U.K. 
Companies Act. However, the scope of Section 166(2) seems to be much wider 
than the U.K. provision and seems to adopt an approach that is truly pluralist.
This is due to the fact that the provision does not create a hierarchy between 
shareholder interests and the interests of the other constituencies, but puts inter-
ests of all constituencies on par.371 In other words, under Section 166(2), the 
protection of non-shareholder constituencies is not predicated on the furtherance 
of the interests of the members themselves.372 Importantly, however, creditors 
do not find any mention under Section 166(2), and are conspicuous by their ab-
sence.
Although there was no corresponding statutory provision in place prior to 
the commencement of the 2013 Act that specifically dealt with directors’ fidu-
ciary duties, Indian law did recognize certain shareholder rights under a variety 
368. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Fi-
nancially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1245–49 (2003).
369. Andrew Keay, The Director’s Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company Cred-
itors: When is it Triggered?, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 315 (2001).
370. Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, § 166(7), 2013 (India).
371. Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201, at 2.
372. Id.
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of statutory provisions and common law.373 The move towards Section 166(2), 
began with proposals to amend the Companies Act, 1956 (“1956 Act”), which 
was a pre-cursor to the 2013 Act. The provision finds its origins in a recom-
mendation made by the Irani Committee Report374 in 2005, which was subse-
quently incorporated in the form of a clause in the Companies Bill, 2008, and 
retained in the same form in the Companies Bill, 2009 (Clause 147 in both 
Bills).375 The draft provision until this stage however was a replica of the ESV 
provision in the U.K., and non-shareholder interests did not find exclusive men-
tion other than for purposes of promoting shareholders’ interests.376 This was 
the case despite the Irani Committee Report having made a specific mention of 
the need to account for non-shareholder interests.
It was only in the Companies Bill, 2011, which was introduced after de-
tailed deliberations by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance,377
that the Clause took a shape and form resembling Section 166(2) as it stands 
today. The Standing Committee, in turn, had acted on a recommendation given 
by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India.378 Certain indirect rights did 
exist in favor of other stakeholders even prior to the commencement of the 2013 
Act, under the broader umbrella of “public interest.”379 These, however, were 
inadequate to offer true protection to these stakeholders, public interest being a 
much higher and much vaguer threshold.
In its concluding remark,380 the Standing Committee expressly clarified that 
the duty would only be owed to the corporate enterprise for the interest of the 
stakeholders, and not to any of its stakeholders directly. This position was not 
expressly mentioned in the 2013 Act, resulting in immense ambiguity in the ac-
tual implementation of the statutory model.
It seems that the adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach under Section 
166(2) was a result of detailed deliberations on the specifics of such a model 
(and its pluralist character).381 The provision should have resulted in much en-
thusiasm amongst non-shareholder constituencies. In reality, the rights availa-
ble under the provision are illusory (even more so than under the ESV provi-
373. Umakanth Varottil, The Evolution of Corporate Law in Post-Colonial India from Trans-
plant to Autochthony, AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 31, 253 (2016).
374. Ministry of Corporate Affairs (2005), Report of the Expert Committee on Company Law,
available at http://reports.mca.gov.in/Reports/23-Irani%20committee%20report%20of%20the%20
expert%20committee%20on%20Company%20law,2005.pdf.
375. Companies Bill, 2008, No. 57, Cl. 147, 2008 (India); Companies Bill 2009, No. 59, Cl.
147, 2008 (India).
376. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201.
377. THE COMPANIES BILL, 2009, Twenty-first Report (Standing Committee on Finance 
2009-10), http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Companies%20Bill%202009.pdf.
378. Id.
379. See, e.g., The State Bank of India Act, No. 23 of 1955, INDIA CODE(1955), § 35A; see 
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sion, the provision having seemed far more inclusive at first blush). In its im-
plementation, Section 166(2) is actually not dissimilar from Section 172(1).
Despite the evident textual disparity between the two provisions, Section 166(2) 
fails to offer a workable pluralist model.
At a fundamental level, the model fails because non-shareholder constituen-
cies are not afforded any statutory remedies for the redress of breaches of duty 
under Section 166(2). Under the 2013 Act, only shareholders can initiate deriv-
ative actions and even class action suits against the company.382383 The statuto-
ry framework disallows class action suits to be brought even on behalf of other 
stakeholders.384 This seems to be the position even for derivative claims; how-
ever, the statutory framework does not provide clarity on this point.385
Another significant issue is that the only identifiable stakeholder that finds 
mention under Section 166(2) (other than the company’s shareholders), is its 
employees.386 The other constituencies mentioned are rather vague (being the 
“community” and the “environment”), and it is hard to determine whether the 
company’s other key constituencies would fall under the scope of the provi-
sion.387 Although similar terms find mention under Section 172(1) of the U.K. 
Companies Act, they appear after the other relevant stakeholders have been 
specifically set out (i.e. employees, suppliers, customers etc.). Thus, rather than 
being progressive, these duties bear a strong resemblance to the “public inter-
est” duties that existed under the previous regime.
Even greater confusion is caused by the fact that it is unclear under the stat-
utory framework whether duties under Section 166(2) are owed directly to these 
constituencies (and not routed through the corporate enterprise). It has been ar-
gued that the mere omission to clarify this fact does not change the “well-
established principle of company law”388 that duties can be owed only to the 
company, and that Section 166(2) cannot be said to have done away with this 
position.389 Another possible interpretation is that the first part of the provision 
requires directors to “act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole,” which constitutes a subjec-
tive test to act for the benefit of the company. The second part of the test re-
382. This duty arising from the common law position, and these rights being unavailable to 
other stakeholders under the UK regime as well. The right of shareholders to file derivative suits 
was expressly recognized in the recent Delhi High Court decision. See Rajeev Saumitra v. Neetu 
Singh & Ors., (2015) I.A. No. 17545/2015 in CS (OS) No. 2528/2015 (2016).
383. § 245 Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).
384. See Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201.
385. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Umakanth Varottil, The Rarity of Derivative Actions in 
India: Reasons and Consequences, in DAN W PUCHNIAK, ET AL, THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 369, 396–97 (Dan W. Puchniak ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2012).
386. Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, §166(2), 2013 (India).
387. Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201, at 14.
388. Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201; Percival, supra note 189.
389. Id.
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quires that such conduct be “in the best interests of the company, its employees, 
the shareholders, the community and for the protection of environment,” which 
constitutes an objective test to act for the benefit of the non-shareholder constit-
uencies.390 The fact that the first part of the test is subjective would also imply 
the applicability of the business judgment rule to this extent. Even if this was 
meant to be the case, no further clarification has been given, whether in statute 
or otherwise.
Professor Varottil and Mihir Naniwadekar argue that “other stakeholders”
might find an indirect remedy against directors under the provisions dealing 
with “oppression and mismanagement” in the 2013 Act391 (although these pro-
visions were primarily meant for the protection of minority shareholders).392
For instance, under Section 241(2), the Central Government is entitled to apply 
to the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), for appropriate orders, in 
case the company’s affairs are being managed in a manner that is prejudicial to 
the public interest. Even the Indian Supreme Court, while dealing with an op-
pression and mismanagement case, held that “the action of the directors must be 
set aside if the same was done oppressively, capriciously, corruptly or in some 
other way mala fide.”393
The ambiguity arising from Section 166(2) can only be addressed in one of 
two ways: (i) by suitable amendments to the statute or by issuance of clarifica-
tions by the courts, or (ii) by the application of established common law princi-
ples to fill up the gaps. Importantly, the question of whether common law is to 
apply vis-à-vis directors’ fiduciary duties (which would run parallel to the duties 
under Section 166(2)) remains unanswered under the Indian statutory frame-
work. This causes several complications. First, Section 166(2) is hardly com-
prehensive enough to provide the full scope of the duties to be owed by direc-
tors at such times. The provision only seems to provide for a personal, and not 
a proprietary remedy, resulting in a situation where no remedy would be availa-
ble to stakeholders for a breach of duty that does not result in a corresponding 
personal gain to the directors.394 Second, as discussed in the following sections, 
the non-applicability of common law would result in an absurd scenario, where 
duties under Section 166(2) would continue to apply to directors of a company 
that has turned insolvent or entered the zone and would thus improperly account 
for the requisite shift of duties that is meant to take place at such times. The is-
sue of applicability of common law in this respect was discussed in a recent 
390. See Sakshi Raje, Fiduciary Duties of Directors, LAW TIMES J. (May 04, 2017), availa-
ble at http://lawtimesjournal.in/fiduciary-duties-directors/.
391. Companies Act of 2013, § 241.
392. Companies (Amendment) Act, 2013, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).
393. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala Ors., (1962) 2 SCR 339.
394. Umakanth Varottil, Codification of Directors’ Duties: Is Common Law Excluded?, India 
Corp Law Blog (May 31, 2014), https://indiacorplaw.in/2014/05/codification-of-directors-duties-
is.html.
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case of the Delhi High Court.395 Although only briefly touching upon the issue 
(by way of obiter), the Court seemed to imply the subsistence of common law 
duties. However, the position on this issue will remain unclear until there is a 
definitive ruling on it.
Similar to the U.K., the newly introduced Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 
2016 (“IB Code”) provides for a provision on “transaction[s] defrauding credi-
tors,” which seems to offer protections to creditors even in financial solvency, 
albeit in a retrospective manner.396 The provision does not provide for any 
look-back period (and would by default also extend to the zone of insolvency) 
and proscribes those transactions that were: (i) entered into at undervalue; and 
(ii) entered into in order to keep assets of the corporate debtor beyond the reach 
of any person who is entitled to make a claim against it; or in order to adversely 
affect the interests of such person in relation to the claim.397 The effect of a 
successful application under this provision is that the NCLT may restore the po-
sition as existed before the entering into of such a transaction. Similarly, Sec-
tion 66(1) of the IB Code also proscribes (without there being any restrictions in 
terms of the time-period within which such transactions are to take place) the 
conducting of any business of the company with the intent to defraud its credi-
tors or for any other fraudulent purpose, and courts have the discretion to order 
directors to make such contributions to the assets of the corporate debtor as they 
deem fit.398 It is important to note that applications under both these provisions 
are only permitted to be made by the resolution professional appointed to take 
over the management of the company. It is yet to be seen how far these provi-
sions go to protect the interests of creditors in practice.
2. The Way Forward
It is clear that Section 166(2) is a highly confused and complicated provi-
sion, and does not “do what it says.” Despite expressly providing for fiduciary 
duties towards non-shareholder constituencies, the provision seems to exclu-
sively promote the interests of the shareholders instead (as explained in the pre-
vious section). It is therefore imperative that the provision be amended or clari-
fied to take a definitive stance on the issue and either: (i) only promote 
shareholders’ interests and do away with the mention of the other constituencies 
altogether (or only include them as a means to further the interests of the mem-
bers themselves, like the ESV in the U.K.), or (ii) continue to account for non-
shareholder constituencies, but accord these constituencies the appropriate re-
medial rights to initiate actions against the directors for breach of their fiduciary 
duties.
395. Rajeev Saumitra v. Neetu Singh & Ors., I.A. No. 17545/2015 in CS (OS) No.
2528/2015.
396. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, § 49, 2016 (India).
397. Id.
398. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, § 66(1), 2016 (India).
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In case the first model is adopted, certain corresponding obligations (alt-
hough not in the form of fiduciary duties) may be provided for in favor of the 
other stakeholders. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the Green Paper 
on Corporate Governance issued by the U.K. in 2016.399 The Green Paper sug-
gests that: (a) stakeholder advisory panels be created for directors to directly 
hear from their key stakeholders; (b) non-executive directors be designated to 
hear voices of key interest groups; (c) individual stakeholder representatives be 
appointed to company boards; and (d) reporting requirements related to stake-
holder engagement be strengthened.400 These features should all be built in and 
operate in a coordinated manner towards protecting the stakeholders’ interests, 
and should not operate in isolation or in exclusion of one another.
In case the second model is adopted (i.e. a truly pluralist approach), it is al-
so imperative that the provision specifically mention and account for the key 
stakeholders and do away with the current ambiguity. Although a pluralist ap-
proach in insolvency may qualify as being “very progressive” (and distinguish-
able from the shareholder primacy model in the U.S., U.K. and elsewhere), it is 
also important that such model account for the possible conflicts and issues that 
may arise as part of its implementation. If this model is adopted, India would 
no longer be able to place reliance on the existing jurisprudence in the West.
Further, in case creditors are recognized as rightful beneficiaries in their own 
right, despite them having contractual protections in their favor, this model 
would have to be sophisticated enough to provide for duties to creditors only 
where absolutely necessary (and thus prevent the confusion arising under the 
“two-masters” conundrum).
Such a model may be along the lines of the “enlightened self-interest” mod-
el adopted in Australia, permitting directors to consider and act in the legitimate 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies to the extent that these interests are 
relevant to the company.401 At the same time, such a model must consider and 
identify sub-classes within each class of stakeholders, and adopt a weighted ap-
proach, with more protection to more vulnerable sub-classes (for e.g. unsecured 
creditors, decree holder creditors etc.).
It is also imperative to clarify that the duty under Section 166(2) is only 
owed to the corporate enterprise, and that the beneficiaries of this duty are only 
permitted to bring derivative actions (on behalf of the company itself) against 
its directors.
399. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, GREEN 
PAPER 2016, (available at https://www.pwc.com/jg/en/events/beis-16-56-corporate-governance-
reform-green-paper-final.pdf).
400. Id.
401. Robin Hollington, Tim Akkouh & Emily Gillett, Companies Act 2006 (1) 151 Solicitors 
J. 12 (2007).
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B. Duties in Insolvency
1. The Existing Position
As mentioned above, there is currently no clarity under the Indian legal 
framework regarding a shift of fiduciary duties that is triggered upon the com-
mencement of the company’s insolvency. A possible reason for this is that Sec-
tion 166(2) (as per its literal reading) is meant to cover all stakeholders, there 
being no necessity to occasion a “shift” as a result.  However, in light of the 
analysis brought out in the U.S. and U.K. sections, it remains a significant issue 
that creditors are not recognized as the primary risk bearers in insolvency (and 
do not find express mention under Section 166(2) either). One explanation is 
that creditors’ interests are covered during insolvency de facto, as the liquidator 
of a company is eligible to recover monies in the name of the company, which 
would then form part of the general pool of assets available to them (in priority) 
during liquidation.402 Another is that the winding up regime under the Compa-
nies Act framework (i.e., the 1956 Act as amended by the 2013 Act) already 
provides for certain duties to creditors in insolvency. For instance, the 1956 Act 
obligated the company’s liquidators to have regard to the resolution of its credi-
tors when there is administration and distribution of the company’s assets,403
thereby overriding any directions given by the advisory committee.404 Creditors 
and contributories are also empowered to inspect the books of the company.405
These duties, however, can hardly be said to be adequate, or even appropriate, 
considering the nature of risk borne by creditors in insolvency.
Thus, there is a legal vacuum in respect of the duties owed to creditors in 
insolvency, and the issue fails to be addressed in a manner similar to the U.S. 
and the U.K.. As also mentioned in the previous section, there is a lack of clari-
ty whether common law is to supplement the duties under Section 166(2), 
which would have specifically accounted for a shift of duties in insolvency (as 
is specifically provided with respect to the ESV duties under Section 170 (4) of 
the U.K. Companies Act).
There is one provision under the 2013 Act which seemingly accounts for 
creditors’ interests from a fiduciary duty perspective in actual insolvency. This 
is Section 340, which is titled Power of Tribunal to Assess Damages Against 
Delinquent Directors, etc.406 This provision permits applications in the course 
of the winding up of a company by the creditors (or the contributories or the 
company/official liquidator) in situations where a director has: (i) misapplied, or 
402. Naniwadekar & Varottil, supra note 201; Percival, supra note 189; Johnson v. Gore 
Wood & Co, [2002] 2 AC 1; ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 522–23
(4th. Sweet & Maxwell, 2011).
403. Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, §292(2), 1956 (India).
404. Id.
405. Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, §549, 1956 (India).
406. Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, §340, 2013 (India).
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retained, or become liable or accountable for, any money or property of the 
company; or (b) been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to 
the company.407 In such a scenario, the Tribunal may order that such a director 
repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with interest at such 
rate as it deems just or proper in respect of the misapplication or breach of trust.
Such an application must be made within five years of the winding up order, or 
of the date of the appointment of the company liquidator; or of the misapplica-
tion, retention, misfeasance or breach of trust, as the case may be, whichever is 
longer.408 This provision is yet to be fully tested by courts, however.
2. The Way Forward
As mentioned above, the Indian legal framework completely ignores the 
significant shift in behavioral patterns and incentives that occurs amongst and 
inter-se the company’s two primary constituencies upon its insolvency. There 
is also no clarity regarding the applicability of common law to fill the gaps in 
this regard. It is therefore important that India not only recognizes the existence 
of the issue but also creates a detailed model to bridge the gap, taking from (and 
learning from the mistakes of) the U.S. and the U.K.
Undoubtedly, such a model must recognize the company’s creditors as its 
primary risk bearers in insolvency, and reject a shareholder primacy approach.
In this regard, the statute may specifically provide for a shift of duties towards 
creditors, or may simply defer to common law in the manner done under Sec-
tion 172(3) (read with Section 170(4)) of the U.K. Companies Act. The former 
approach is definitely preferable, in my opinion. Notwithstanding the route 
adopted, a decision would need to be made regarding the nature of claims that 
can be brought by creditors, i.e.: (i) whether creditors’ interests are to be ac-
counted for only as the residual claimants, with the directors’ duties being owed 
to the corporate enterprise, and creditors only being eligible to bring derivative 
claims against the company (as was laid down in Gheewalla in the U.S., and
which is the current statutory position in the U.K.); or (ii) to accord direct duties 
to creditors and the right to bring direct claims against the company.
Adopting the derivative approach makes more sense because of the compli-
cations associated with a model that recognizes direct claims. Adopting this 
approach will do away with the possibility of creditors initiating multiple con-
current and frivolous actions against the company at a time when the energies of 
directors should be focused on reviving the company and its operations. Credi-
tors with secondary and subservient charges will thus also be precluded from 
bringing actions which would enable them to unfairly benefit in a manner where 
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At the same time however, this Comment proposes certain exceptions and 
modifications to the Gheewala approach. The direct incorporation of the model
would not be beneficial. First, the rule should expressly provide for the possi-
bility of a direct action on behalf of a specific creditor/ group of creditors to-
wards whom the directors’ conduct has been especially and deliberately egre-
gious and mala fide (in other words, as held in Production Resources, there 
being a “marked degree of animus towards a particular creditor”).409 This 
should not result in the opening of the floodgates of litigation (as happened pur-
suant to the decision in Production Resources in the U.S.) and thus effectively 
alter the very nature of the model itself (i.e. away from the “derivative” ap-
proach). Thus, the standard and threshold of the grievance underlying the credi-
tor’s claim must be kept high enough for the claim to be resorted to only in “ra-
re and special” circumstances.  Second, this exception should be applied in a 
weighted manner, giving additional protection and recognition to vulnerable 
classes of creditors that do not have the comforts and protections of secured 
creditors.
It is imperative to supplement and clarify the nature of this duty with an ap-
propriate and definitive trigger test to determine the commencement of insol-
vency. In this regard, the issue is even more complicated than in the U.S. and 
the U.K., which suffer from a problem of multiplicity of tests. In India, under 
the recently introduced IB Code, a corporate insolvency resolution process 
(“CIRP”) can be initiated against a company (by any of the company’s credi-
tors, or by the company itself) that has defaulted on its debts to the tune of at 
least INR 1 lakh (approximately 1540 USD).410 The initiation of the CIRP 
against such a company is subject to the confirmation of the existence of the de-
fault by the NCLT. After initiation of the CIRP, the company’s management 
(including its board of directors) are replaced by an insolvency professional that 
takes over the management of the company during the CIRP.411 Post-CIRP, the 
company will either no longer be insolvent and will restart operations as a fi-
nancially stable entity, or will be liquidated. Thus, it becomes highly problem-
atic to attribute an insolvency trigger for fiduciary duties arising out of the 
scheme of the IB Code.
Adopting the IB Code trigger to determine the commencement of insolven-
cy is also not recommended due to the extremely low standard for determining 
the occurrence of a default (and thus insolvency).  The threshold of a default 
under the IB Code is likely to be breached and remedied on a constant basis.412
Even if insolvency is triggered only when an application for the initiation of a 
CIRP is admitted by the NCLT, this would be redundant from a fiduciary duty 
perspective because the directors are no longer in control of the management of 
409. Production Resources, supra note 82, at 43.
410. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, India Code, § 4(1).
411. Id. at §17(1).
412. A similar objection had been raised by Leonard Sealy in the UK context. See supra note 
325.
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the company after this point. Thus, although likely to cause confusion at first, it 
is recommended that a completely distinct and exclusive test be introduced for 
purposes of determining the commencement of insolvency from a shift in fidu-
ciary duty perspective. In this regard, India may consider the test brought out in 
Permakraft, i.e., whether the occurrence of insolvency was “reasonably within 
the knowledge or ought to have been in the knowledge” of the relevant direc-
tors.413 This needs to be supported by a formal and substantive trigger test, 
however.
The test that is finally adopted should be clearly distinguishable to the one 
applicable to the zone of insolvency, and there should be no possibility of con-
flation in this regard. In this respect, India may also consider the draft provision 
recommended by the CLRSG in the U.K. (although not specifically providing 
for a shift of duties towards creditors), which provided for a test which is trig-
gered where “it is more likely than not that the company will at some point be 
unable to pay its debts as they fall due.”414 In the interim (until the point that 
such a test is adopted and implemented), it may be recommended that India in-
corporate a Vertin-like standard (as laid down by the Delaware Chancery Court) 
and protect the sanctity of derivative claims initiated by creditors even if the 
company turns solvent during the pendency of the lawsuit.415 Further, any such 
duty must only be applied in conjunction with the business judgment rule which 
should be expressly extended to apply post the commencement of insolvency.
C. Duties in the Vicinity/ Zone of Insolvency
1. The Existing Position
As is the case in actual insolvency, the Indian courts and legislature have 
not expressly accounted for a shift in fiduciary duties on the company having 
breached the zone of insolvency. There is also no definitive ruling or clarifica-
tion on whether common law can be read in to provide the requisite clarity.
This issue needs to be addressed promptly to bring India in line with the global 
standards, to duly account for the polarization of interests or incentives amongst 
a company’s primary constituencies when it is in a state of financial deteriora-
tion, and to accord protection to the true and rightful claimants in such a scenar-
io.
India however applies a “wrongful trading” standard that is akin to the one 
under Section 214 of the U.K. Insolvency Act.  This is mentioned in Section 
66(2) of the IB Code:
413. Nicholson v. Permakraft, [1985] 1 NZLR 242, at 250 (N.Z.).
414. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR 
A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT, 2001, (U.K.).
415. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vetrin, 115 A.3d 535 (Del. Ch. 2015).
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(2) On an application made by a resolution professional during the corporate insol-
vency resolution process, the Adjudicating Authority may by an order direct that a 
director or partner of the corporate debtor, as the case may be, shall be liable to 
make such contribution to the assets of the corporate debtor as it may deem fit, if—
(a) before the insolvency commencement date, such director or partner knew or 
ought to have known that the there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding the 
commencement of a corporate insolvency resolution process in respect of such 
corporate debtor; and
(b) such director or partner did not exercise due diligence in minimising the po-
tential loss to the creditors of the corporate debtor.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section a director or partner of the corporate 
debtor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have exercised due diligence if such 
diligence was reasonably expected of a person carrying out the same functions as 
are carried out by such director or partner, as the case may be, in relation to the 
corporate debtor.416
This provision clearly contemplates director’s duties towards the company’s
creditors prior to the commencement of insolvency (where there was knowledge 
of, or there ought to have been knowledge of the company’s impending insol-
vency).  Much like the wrongful trading provision in the U.K., Section 66(2) 
provides that an application can only be made by the resolution professional 
(like the U.K. statutory framework, which only permits the liquidator to make 
such an application) and also makes directors liable to make contributions to the 
assets of the company if such application is successful. Similar is the case with 
Section 214 by employing an objective “knew or ought to have known” test, 
enabling the NCLT to adopt a more scientific approach to determine the breach 
of the duty, and precluding an inconsistent case-by-case approach like the one 
for creditors in the zone under common law.
Section 66(2) of the IB Code adopts a much higher standard than the U.K. 
provision however, in that it is pegged against the reasonable apprehension of 
the commencement of a CIRP, as opposed to insolvent liquidation (under the 
U.K. provision).417 This could theoretically create several issues, as discussed 
in detail in the section below. Section 66(2) remains to be tested, as the IB 
Code is relatively new. Only time will tell whether the provision will truly pro-
tect creditors’ interests in the zone of insolvency.
Further, as mentioned earlier, creditors may also be afforded the protection 
under Sections 49 and 66(1) of the IB Code in the zone of insolvency.
2. The Way Forward
It is crucial that India recognizes the existence of the zone of insolvency and 
its interplay with directors’ fiduciary duties. Whether it does this by way of a 
416. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, India Code, § 66(2).
417. Id.
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statutory amendment or by deferring to common law is something that must be 
left to the wisdom of the legislature. The question then is whether India should 
follow the approach adopted in the U.S. or that of the U.K.. The U.S. approach 
would involve steering clear of creditors’ interests pre-insolvency, as was held 
in Gheewala and would require a continued focus on the interests of the corpo-
rate enterprise from the perspective of shareholder rights. The U.K. approach, 
on the other hand, by deferring to common law on this point, provides for a shift 
towards creditors’ interests as the company enters the zone.
This Comment disagrees with the US approach at a fundamental level, as 
shareholders cannot be said to be the primary risk bearers of a company in the 
zone of insolvency. Shareholders’ behavior is bound to change at the slightest 
hint that the insolvency of the company is imminent. A direct analogy to such 
behavior can be found when one looks at trading patterns in the stock market, 
shareholders being known to liquidate their stockholding at the very hint of bad 
news. It is then inapposite to contend that shareholders can be trusted to have 
the best interests of the company in mind, even when it has reached a financial-
ly precarious state. Protections in favor of creditors have no bearing on the in-
centive structure or the risk matrix in the zone and contractual protections can-
not be assumed to be the norm especially given the preponderance of 
unprotected and vulnerable creditors in today’s business scenario. This Com-
ment disagrees with Kandestin418 and others,419 who are of the opinion that di-
rectors cannot, or should not, play the role of trustees/fiduciaries of creditors 
prior to insolvency. As proposed by Grantham, the argument for duties being 
owed to creditors in the zone is that it accords “the greatest protection at the 
time of the greatest risk.”420
Creditors should be treated as the primary risk bearers, and the company 
should be run in their interests after it has entered the zone. It is true that credi-
tors are prone to conservative decision making, and would essentially “run the 
corporation to the ground” with many crucial decisions exceeding their risk ap-
petite. Thus, any model that is developed must provide enough leeway for di-
rectors to make important decisions that would enable the company to continue 
as a going concern. The specifics of such a model, again, are difficult to con-
template. One possible solution is that a statutory provision be included to 
permit directors to approach courts and attain specific sanction for such deci-
sions and that approval be granted if such decisions are not unduly prejudicial to 
creditor interests. Directors would thus be accorded immunity to make such de-
cisions without the threat of an adverse ex post determination by courts.
Although this model might result in inconveniences for directors, this ap-
proach would ordinarily be followed only for crucial, high-risk decisions that 
directors would be otherwise skeptical of taking without such approval. In any 
418. Kandestin, supra note 16.
419. See Bainbridge, supra note 12.
420. Ross B. Grantham, The Judicial Extension of Directors’ Duties to Creditors, J. BUS. L.
1991, at 8.
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case, the costs (both in terms of money and time) of repeatedly approaching 
courts would operate as a disincentive to directors, and they would refrain from 
doing so in order to seek approval for insignificant decisions. The hidden bene-
fit of this model is that directors can also implicitly seek confirmation that the 
company has indeed entered the zone, such a determination ideally being a sine 
qua non for the maintainability of such a reference to the courts. In the alterna-
tive, given that Indian courts are rather overburdened, the Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs may appoint a designated officer to provide guidance on these matters, 
even in the form of “informal guidance” as is currently given to companies by 
the Securities and Exchange Board of India.421
This model brings about issues, like in the U.S. and the U.K., regarding a 
definitive and objective test for the determination of what constitutes the zone 
of insolvency and when a company enters the zone. The model would suffer if 
a plain vanilla “balance sheet” or “cash flow” test was adopted. The test should 
be more comprehensive and should provide for a variety of both quantitative 
and qualitative criteria, in order to provide greater guidance to directors. It is 
important that a company not be deemed to be in the zone simply due to the fact 
that its directors have made “a sizeable enough bet.”422 Such a test would be 
akin to the one established in Brandt v. Micks in the U.K., and would be very 
easily triggered without any real probability of the company actually being fi-
nancially instable.423 In this regard, India may consider the holding in BTI 2014 
LLC to ensure that a company is not inappropriately deemed to be in the 
zone.424 Further, this test must be supplemented by a Charterbridge like trigger 
in order to grant it greater objectivity.425426
Although this Comment suggests that the trigger for duties in the zone of 
insolvency in the U.K. be modelled on the test for wrongful trading under Sec-
tion 214, it does not suggest the same for India. As explained above, the 
threshold to initiate a CIRP against a company is too low in India. India may, 
however, draw from the U.K. and include the Section 214 standard as part of 
the various criteria on which the test is triggered.
There should also be continued applicability of the business judgment rule 
in the vicinity of insolvency which would in any case be incorporated to a cer-
tain extent if the Charterbridge principles are incorporated.427 Further, this 
should also provide immunity for actions that result in a “deepening” of insol-
vency, as long as decisions were carried out in the best interests of the corpora-
421. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Informal Guidance) Scheme, 2003.
422. Tung, supra note 158, at 623.
423. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco International), 208 B.R. 288, 305–07
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
424. BTI 2014 LLC v. B.A.T. Industries PLC [2016] EWHC(Ch)1686(Eng.).
425. Charterbridge Corp. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., [1970] Ch. 62 [Charterbridge].
426. Id.
427. Id.
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tion, as has been specifically clarified in the U.S.428 Such a standard should 
necessarily include a “good faith” criterion (as has been the norm elsewhere).
Earlier court decisions in India have already interpreted “good faith” to mean 
that all endeavors of directors are to be directed for the benefit of the compa-
ny.429
On the other hand, if the U.S. position is adopted (although not being pref-
erable), the conundrum brought about by Gheewala should be pre-emptively 
avoided by expressly providing that creditors are not to be afforded the right to 
initiate any claims (whether direct or derivative) prior to the commencement of 
actual insolvency. Under this model, directors should continue to function for 
the benefit of the corporate enterprise and its shareholders until and unless it 
goes into actual insolvency, at which point the duties would shift to the credi-
tors.
India might also consider revisiting its wrongful trading standard (as pre-
scribed under Section 66(2) of the IB Code). As mentioned above, the thresh-
old applicable to the provision is too low for directors to properly account for its 
implications at the relevant times. Although the intent of the provision clearly 
seems to be to accord duties to creditors in the zone, these duties come into ef-
fect too late to offer any real protection at all. The “waiting period” between 
the occurrence of a default (of INR 1 lakh and upwards) and the initiation of 
CIRP is very short (a financial creditor being eligible to file an application as 
soon as the default occurs (and ordinarily after accelerating the repayment of its 
debt), and the NCLT being obligated to admit such an application within 14 
days of its filing430).431
Although the “explanation” incorporated towards the end of the provision 
goes further than the U.K. provision in terms of providing clarity, it is still not 
clear what exactly must be done in order to minimize potential loss to creditors.
As already stated, the IB Code proscribes inter alia preferential transactions, 
undervalued transactions and transactions defrauding creditors during certain 
“look-back periods” prior to the commencement of insolvency. Does this mean 
that the effect of Section 66(2) is to ensure that directors do not take any deci-
sions that involve an element of risk? No such clarity has been provided. If a 
new and robust trigger test is established for insolvency, the test under Section 
66(2) must also be amended to be pegged against such a test. Further, as Gabri-
el Moss states, such a test must not necessitate the demonstration of a “net defi-
ciency in the asset value of the company,” but should be triggered on the basis 
of an actual quantification of liabilities incurred after the relevant cut-off 
428. Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 218(Del.
Ch. 2006).
429. Turner Morrison & Co. v. Shalimar Tar Products, (1980) 50 Comp Cas 296 (Cal).
430. This timeline has been held to be directory and not mandatory by the Supreme Court in 
Surendra Trading Company v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited, AIR 2018 SC 186.
431. Section 7(4), INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE (2016).
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date.432 In this regard, India may also consider adopting the German approach 
of according special protection to ‘new’ creditors that have lent money to the 
company after the cut-off date provided for in the test, in order to prevent cir-
cumvention of the provision. Further, as also suggested with respect to Section 
214 of the U.K. Insolvency Act, creditors should be afforded the right to initiate 
direct actions for wrongful trading and not have to rely on the resolution profes-
sional to do so.
It is also imperative that Indian courts explicitly recognize and account for 
the possibility of “hindsight bias” in deciding cases pertaining to breach of fidu-
ciary duties in the vicinity of insolvency, and especially under Section 66(2) (a 
right to apply under this Section only accruing to the resolution professional af-
ter the initiation of a CIRP).
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the U.S. and the U.K. have come far in their analysis of the 
scope and operation of fiduciary duties and their beneficiaries. Although cer-
tain broad principles apply across the board, the divergence in models has large-
ly been a result of the difference in interpretational methodologies applied by 
the courts and legislatures in both jurisdictions. For instance, by giving more 
importance and recognition to contractual rights that are available to creditors, 
the decisions in Gheewala, Production Resources, and Trenwick America took 
U.S. law in a completely different direction than U.K. law in the context of the 
vicinity of insolvency.
It is also clear that the models in both jurisdictions are still lacking in many 
regards and continue to function sub-optimally. The lack of clarity on several 
issues has left directors flummoxed about the true nature and the beneficiaries 
of their fiduciary duties and when a shift in those duties triggers. It is discon-
certing that two of the most developed legal systems in the world have not been 
able to fully address important gaps in respect of an issue that is at the forefront 
of corporate governance today.
The Indian legal framework in this regard is still in a nascent stage and is in 
desperate need of a more nuanced approach towards fiduciary duties. As of to-
day, the Indian framework only expressly provides for fiduciary duties owed in 
financial solvency, and is silent on what is to happen when the company enters 
the zone of insolvency or finally becomes insolvent. As has always been the 
case, India is bound to look at more developed jurisdictions in the West for an-
swers.
The fact that India has just recently moved to a more robust insolvency re-
gime under the IB Code provides a ripe opportunity for it to be pro-active and to 
incorporate a suitable model governing fiduciary duties. Not doing so might 
result in grave consequences for India’s business sector and the various stake-
432. Moss, supra note 352.
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holders who depend on Indian corporations for their sustenance and financial 
stability. The framework as it exists today provides immense opportunity for 
misuse and for rogue directors to manage their companies in a manner that 
would benefit only themselves. As can be seen from the Western models, am-
biguity in the regime governing fiduciary duties creates opportunities for abuse 
and allows for directors to disregard others with impunity. Prolonged litigation 
is not an option for the weak and vulnerable, especially in a country like India.
In order to ensure that India does not also incorporate within its model the 
various flaws that are native to these Western jurisdictions, these flaws must be 
recognized and properly accounted for in statute. The Indian model must also 
include a level of detail and sophistication that would prevent any misinterpreta-
tion by courts and repetition of the mistakes of the Western models. India may 
thus look to adopt a novel approach (the details of which have been set out in 
this Comment), which has been untested by the West, but has the potential to 
offer a truly workable model.
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